Civil society in Pakistan philosophy - Revised by Editor Tibyan England

The Problem of Islamization of Civil Society In context of Pakistani Society Introduction Pakistan's civil society Civil society has modern competitors, whose chief claim is to offer the shared moral vision that civil society lacks. Islam, Gellner argues, far from being a reactionary throwback or flight from modernity, has proven itself an astonishingly adaptive alternative to civil society. To the disoriented, individualized urban dweller of the Third World -- living through the chaos of urbanization, underdevelopment, and the botched modernizations of weak postcolonial states -Islam offers a sacred code that provides metaphysical reassurance and the detailed regulation of private behavior once offered in tribal society. Islam thus is an exceptionally effective response to the spiritual and practical needs of a disoriented urban population in the throes of modernization. It offers the imaginary community that the real world of political and social life so signally lacks. Thus, in the Islamic world, Gellner argues, the masses put up with corrupt polities and unjust social orders because they believe that their rulers remain subjects, like them, of the same sacred order and moral law. Like Marxism, Islam sacralizes daily life by minute regulation of private behavior. But Islam has shown much greater staying power than Marxism: it has never made the mistake of offering paradise here on earth. It also has the immeasurable advantage of having it both ways in relation to wealth: it accepts riches when they come and offers the compensations of high-minded indifference when they do not. Thus, Islam cushions the Muslim masses from the endemic failure of these societies to successfully emulate the West while comfortably rationalizing the economic privileges of the elite. Islam is not the only competitor to Western civil society. In passing, Gellner discusses the attractiveness of the emerging forms of Asiatic capitalism, which, in its Chinese, Taiwanese, Singaporean, and Malaysian variants, combines a dynamic market economy with political authoritarianism and, in place of a free civil society, offers a tightly bound kinship society. The evident appeal of such societies is that they offer an ingenious solution to capitalist anomie: the

individual remains encased within the disciplines of authoritarian order from above and kinship and family networks from below. It contrasts sharply with the abundance of published studies on other civil society participation. Malik's (1997), dissertation on Pakistani civil society addresses Political, ethnic, and ideological concerns confronting Pakistan. Few powerful individuals rule the country unorganized and authoritarian manner, keeping the political and administrative systems together. The military and bureaucracy grew to prominence and, together with feudal elites, attempted to stifle the development of vibrant democratic culture and ethnic diversity in the country, resulting in a shift in the power dynamic between the state and society. As a result, the power dynamic between the government and its population transformed. Indifference, fear, or manipulation of ideological and pluralist fighters by powerful forces has resulted in unequal power relationships, allowing for intellectual manipulation, dissent, and ethnic backlashes. As a result, an unbalanced scenario has emerged (Malik 1997). Invoking Islamic theology, the state has curtailed the rights of ethnic minorities to maintain national unity and homogeneity, with Ernest Gellner's widely utilized model designed to give a standard framework for understanding allimportant and present Muslim communities. All of these cultures share sociology marked by conflicts between urban and rural life, religious pluralism, and the supremacy of ulama as the leaders of a solidary society founded on Scripture and Divine Law inside the urban form. In this political framework, groups that do not completely recognize the central government's authority, such as border tribes and the urban populace headed by the ulama, offer ongoing challenges to the state's political power. The current rise of Islamism in politics may be explained by the fact that, although modernity has abolished tribal supremacy, urbanization and mass literacy have increased the religion-based urban ethos and its opposition to secular governance. This notion has been disputed both historically and recently. It is argued that the concepts and things represented by these themes, such as the category of "ulama," are not sociological or political contents; rather, they are assigned unique meanings and roles by sociopolitical contexts. 1|Page

Secular age and modern Islamism A Secular Age, focuses on the close relation of religion to culture, which is always expressed within a particular historical context.1 In his view, the most important feature of modern culture is its tendency toward impersonality, which creates a frame of immanence. This frame, which provides a new context for our thoughts and actions, is common to people all over the modern Western world, where religion is now almost absent from the public sphere. However, secularism does not necessarily mean atheism, and Taylor observes that it is not that religion has completely disappeared, but rather that it has been transformed According to Taylor, the process of secularization which began in the seventeenth century has resulted in an immanent order, which is destroying our sense of transcendence. Although the immanent frame is now common to all people in the modern Western world, there are still some who remain open to the idea of something beyond, just as there are those totally closed to this idea. However, in general terms, we now live within this frame and treat it as a kind of new natural order. Taylor adheres to Max Weber’s diagnosis of our epoch as being a time of disenchantment, the removal of magic from our perception of the world. Although this formerly enchanted world may be contrasted with the present disenchanted one, the new form of social self-perception also has many facets. It is accompanied by the replacement of a porous or absorbent self with a buffered self, where things are kept at a distance, and a situation in which depths once located in the cosmos are now placed frmly within the world. Nevertheless, while certain modes of wonderment may well have been undermined, new modes of experience are still possible, and Taylor suggests that a sense of wonderment could these days be based on a purely anthropocentric appreciation of the world. However, since a scientifc, reductive explanation of human life (naturalism) is incompatible with this position, he argues for the rejection of this reductionist view. Modern Islamism has arisen as a major language for expressing a wide variety of interests, ambitions, and frustrations that have nothing in common with those articulated in traditional forms of Islam in recent years. As a result, it has surpassed secular nationalism and Marxism as the dominant ideology. The tremendous range of historical and present social and political 2|Page

structures in Muslim cultures can only be viewed as variations on a shared paradigm of an essential Muslim society, as with any other collection of civilizations. The discontent of secular NGOs with the state-religious relationship is another point he drives home. The (NGOs) as instances of the secular establishment's willingness to back Musharraf's dictatorship in order to keep religious groups from becoming too powerful However, suppose the co-option of the state by secular civil society is seen as a desperate and unavoidable war to nourish and expand civil society in Pakistan. In that case, the connection between the state and religious institutions must be viewed similarly. According to him, civil society in Pakistan cannot thrive until the bulk of the country's population accepts a secular viewpoint (A. Shah 2004) It consists of more traditionally-minded, religiously conservative ethnic, denominational, clan, and traditionalist groups (Qadeer 1997). Throughout his analysis of Pakistani society, he stresses the state's bias toward religious groups, which he attributes to international and regional pressures as well as the country's history of military coups. He effectively characterized Pakistani society's historical underpinnings and dynamic growth by examining its religious component. He was too busy investigating other aspects of civil society progress, to follow up on the secular-religious battle in Pakistan since he first published his results. This was due to his strong interest in problems concerning the development of civic society. After September 11th, 2001, Pakistan's leadership under Musharraf rethought its regional security strategy and joined forces with the United States to combat terrorism. Religious organizations in Pakistan came under pressure for the first time in the country's history as a direct consequence of the necessity to implement a new strategy inside the country (Shah and Qazi 2022). In light of recent events, such as the Taliban's possible takeover of a nuclear-armed state and the role of religious organizations in fueling both internal and external extremism, a new understanding of Pakistani culture is necessary. To achieve this purpose, this study builds on Qadeer's (1997) thesis by examining Pakistan's history through the lens of the secular-religious struggle. 3|Page

To explain Pakistan's apparent "weakness" and fragmentation, research on Pakistani civil society almost invariably focuses on the state and its institutions, such as the military and the bureaucracy, or power relations. This is because Pakistan's political and social order is dependent on the state and its institutions (Moser and Skripchenko 2018). In these studies, the state, military, bureaucracy, international relations, and other institutions have been repeatedly blamed for the demise of civil society. However, these studies have put doubt on the compatibility of contemporary secular and traditional religious civil society components and their antagonism (Yabanci 2019). Growth of civil society in Pakistan Max Weber was struck by cultural phenomena that he considered to be unique in the West, such as its development of science, art, and the economy. He explained them by a specifc kind of “rationalization” that despite their uniqueness, “as at least we like to believe, developed in a direction of universal signifcance and validity.” The point here is not whether Weber was right to ascribe this uniqueness to the West. Rather, it is that he ascribed the development, frst, to “value spheres”— to science, art, politics, and the economy. Second, he ascribed “universal signifcance and validity” to their development. He implied that to understand modern secular society, we have to understand it as a compound of value spheres, each of which results from a development of “universal signifcance and validity.” The signifcance and validity is that of a developmental logic inherent in the sphere. Its universality and validity mean that the same development would occur anywhere if there was the same “concatenation of circumstances” that allowed the development in the West. Third, he presupposed that a value sphere is defned by its pursuit of a sphere-immanent or intrinsic goal by which the perfection and rationality of any action within a sphere can be measured. Therefore, we can talk of progress and regress in an action sphere, depending on whether actions are nearer to or farther away from the intrinsic goal of the sphere. Compare the growth of civil society in Pakistan to that of the West, where principles such as democracy and pluralism are valued more highly. This condition is characterized by a lack of communication or interchange, often leading to a collision of viewpoints. The state of Pakistan 4|Page

is at the center of this drama. Yet, many Pakistanis are unaware of its origin and purpose and the role religion plays in political events. Pakistan is a modern secular state with a strong Islamic identity. The objective of religious leaders is to establish an Islamic state, but whether or not democratic institutions would be included remains to be seen. On the other hand, other organizations urge for a secular, democratic, and pluralistic state that promotes and defends free discourse among its inhabitants. These societies are known as secularists. The present scenario in Pakistan offers a once-in-a-lifetime chance to see a functioning civil society (Rosilawati, et al. 2018). Many researches argued that traditional Western norms are inadequate for assessing Pakistan's dynamic civil society. The issue is further complicated by the state's aim to form an alliance with the religious sector of civil society in order to increase its legitimacy and widen its security objectives. Many contemporary, secular NGOs represent the spirit of today's civil society. This section of society depends heavily on funding and assistance from outside. People tend to swing back and forth between intense piety and atheism. They are not interested in being led by secularists, atheists, or fundamentalists. This research aims to develop novel methods of recognizing and assessing civil society occurrences in Pakistan since the existing literature does not provide a comprehensive enough picture. The Development of Civil Society in Pakistan In the preface to the Philosophie des Rechts (1820), Hegel coined the phrase “das Prinzip des Protestantismus.”1,2 This principle addresses human autonomy and freedom. Philosophy made this religious principle “real” and Enlightenment philosophers and French revolutionaries accomplished the work Luther began.3 By removing the obstacles between God and man, Protestantism had abolished the medieval separation between clergy and laity.4 Man regained the true consciousness of God’s infnite love, and this love transforms society as a whole. Luther’s reformation implied a revolution of human life.5 The medieval Church subverted human morality by promoting the belief in an afterlife and imposing continence, celibacy, and poverty, which undermine the virtues of civil society.6 Roman Catholicism preserved “this separation of the religious from the secular.”7 According to Hegel, Luther’s revolt implied the 5|Page

“secularity” (Weltlichkeit) of Christianity by integrating religion into the world and making it part of our life.8 Hegel’s concept of secularisation implied a rationalisation of religion and an immanent morality. Pakistan has a robust civil society that is involved in many facets of the country's social and political life. When seen through the lens of the pre-existing sociopolitical systems in Pakistan, the Western goals of fostering democratic space, pluralism, and tolerance in the country's civil society seem unrealistic. There are several diverse factions within Pakistani society, each with its own philosophy, worldview, sociological characteristics, and international support network (Bajpai 2022). During the early colonial era, the Muslim nobility of the subcontinent was virtually divided in half. Some Westerners assumed that Muslims would keep to themselves, untouched by the universities and political systems of the West. They reasoned that Muslims' decline in political influence was attributable to their declining religious observance and made the decision to focus on religious instruction as a result. People who saw the world more optimistically advocated for more opportunities for public education and civic engagement (DeMatthews 2018). The modernist and secular Muslim movement in India may trace its roots back to Sir Syed Ahmed Khan. Several of the schools he founded went on to become nationally recognized hubs of academic excellence. For his emphasis on instructing Muslims using English and contemporary techniques, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan came under fire from the ulama 1. The ulama have just issued a religious edict declaring him a fatwa2. Thus, the beginning of friction between the secular and religious aspects of Indian culture may be traced back to the introduction of modern and Western influences to the subcontinent. In other words, they conformed to the modern and secular tendencies of the day by using religious arguments against modernity, making them essentially contemporary. However, because of 1 Islamic religious knowledge defenders, communicators, and translators Because of his contemporary interpretations of Islam, a Fatwa (religious decision) pronouncing his apostasy was issued. 6|Page 2

colonial rule, neither group had much influence over the course of events. After the nationalism movement, they finally began to emerge as somewhat autonomous political forces (Suny 2019). Trends in Pakistan and the Character of Religious-Secular Conflict At the beginning of the 20th century, political leaders in India began to advocate for greater independence from the British Empire. The Indian National Congress (INC) and the All India Muslim League were the two most influential organizations that claimed to remove British control in India. Both of these organizations were founded in 1885. (AIML). The All India Muslim League was headed by rationalists and intellectuals such as Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Allama Mohammad Iqbal (Shahid and Naeem 2018). Initially, on the INC's side, they eventually began to desire a Muslim state made up of provinces with a Muslim majority after understanding that their rights would not be adequately safeguarded in a united India. In regards to safeguarding the civil, political, and religious liberties of Muslims, the two sides were unable to come to an agreement. Iqbal saw Islam as a tool for social change because of its ability to motivate and bind people together. He maintained that the survival of the Muslim cultural identity in a united India was in jeopardy and that a Muslim majority state was desperately required. Jinnah saw Islam be a unifying and revitalizing force that gave purpose to a people whose only other option was to accept permanent minority status. After Pakistan's establishment, a unified Pakistani nationhood was crucial, he says. He believed that only a united nation could effectively combat xenophobia, bigotry, and other forms of bigotry on the municipal, state, and federal levels (Malik 1997). On the Indian subcontinent, the Muslim clergy was deeply divided along sectarian and theological lines. The majority of Deobandi Ulama, including those who made up Maulana Maudoodi's Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and Jamiat Ulama-e-Hind (JUH), was hostile to the idea of a Muslim nation-state3. The religious-military activity was another front on which JUH, an anticolonial activist, was involved. Top officials, however, were aligned with the Indian National Congress (INC) and were staunch opponents of religious sectarianism in India. The leaders of 3 Deobandi is a Sunni revivalist movement that adheres to the Hanafi School of law and was founded in the late nineteenth century around the Darul Uloom Madrassa in Deoband. 7|Page

JUH were concerned that Muslims would be further marginalized in politics if India were split in two, so they initially advocated for freedom from colonial rule. Many religious leaders have created political parties with anti-colonial and anti-league beliefs, like the Tehrik-e-Khaksar and the Majlise-Ahrar. Maulana Maudoodi and his party opposed the idea of a Muslim nation-state due to their belief that it was part of a larger plot to sow discord within the Muslim ummah4 (Malik 1997). While the Brelvi ulama and pirs were certainly influential, their influence was mostly local or national. For this reason, the All India Muslim League (AIML) had to make additional efforts to gain their support. A group of Deobandi ulama who opposed JUH's position and supported Jinnah's initiative to establish Pakistan created Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam (JUI). Nasr (2000), claims that the Madni Group5, comprised of the most prominent Deobandi ulama, frequented JUH. In 1945, the less powerful Deobandi ulama the Thanvi Group6 left JUH to join Jinnah's campaign for an independent Muslim state, and they battled against Jinnah's vision for Pakistan (Nasr 2000). To attain its aim of a Muslim-dominated nation-state, the AIML's leadership adopted the two-nation doctrine. It was argued that as Hindus and Muslims are fundamentally different, they should each have their own country. Islam served as a binding and unifying force on the path to the establishment of a sovereign state. Matrix Reduction Pakistan means God is one Pakistan ka matlb kya? La Ilaha Illallah became the movement's rallying cry in its latter years. Despite the religious elite's opposition to the notion of Pakistan, the majority of Muslims feel that theological basis for the construction of a distinct Muslim state is the most significant factor in creating a separate Muslim state. The religious basis for India's partition is frequently cited in support of the "two-nation idea." Jalal (1985), explores the numerous potential and problems associated with the split of India into smaller states. She held the view that the desire for a physical Pakistan was misguided, and that the term "Pakistan" had distinct connotations for individuals living in Muslim-majority and Hindu-dominated regions of India. Scholars of Pakistan frequently disagree on how the country 4 global community of Muslims The Madni Group, headed by Maulana Hussain Ahmad Madni of the JUH, was anti-Jinnah and anti-Pakistan. 6 Thanvi Group and their political organisation JUI backed the concept of Pakistan. Ashraf Ali Thanvi, a prominent religious scholar, is honoured with the naming of this place. 8|Page 5

was run before division and whether or not its founders supported a truly democratic government. They cannot be the focus of our inquiry. The "two-nation theory" seems to be the most popular theory put out to explain the tense dynamics in Pakistani society. The Islamization of the State and Society Although democracy in Pakistan has collapsed, that has not stifled the development of the country's civil society. General Muhammad Zia-ul- Haq declaration imposed martial rule in July 1977 in response to protests over election fraud and calls for Nizam-e-Mustafa7. In the wake of anti-Bhutto rallies orchestrated by the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), Zia was able to seize power (Shouket and Shakeel 2018). The PNA had widespread support from rural residents, residents of the bazaar area, Muslims, and other religious communities. To counter the secular and progressive groups that flourished during Bhutto's tenure, two civil society factions representing conservative elements within Pakistan's various socioeconomic strata developed. Bhutto said that the PPP (Pakistan People’s Party), women's groups, liberal academics, and other secular individuals were the backbone of the opposition against military control. The military government made no effort to silence dissenters and protesters. After Bhutto was executed and elections were postponed beyond the 90 days promised, Zia decided to use the full weight of the state to calm the pro-Bhutto masses. He reasoned that doing so would win him more supporters and legitimize his tyrannical reign. Mosques, schools, and other Islamic organizations received strong support from Zia's government. In order to Islamize society and theocratize the state, he enacted laws and institutions like as the Shariat Bill and Shariat courts, and the Concept of chadar and chardewari8 and nizam-e-salat9 and the hudood ordinance10 as well as blasphemy legislation and a separate electorate for minorities. On top of that, he set up a government-run method of collecting Zakat11 and Ushr12 (Tew 2018). 7 Prophet's Order Women who are confined to the confines of the home 9 Mandating daily prayers for all citizens 10 Islamic set of punishments for the crime 11 The zakat is a kind of religious tax that Muslims pay on their cash, precious metals, and other assets. A fixed amount of wealth (now 2,5 percent) must be allocated annually to the poor and needy. In Islam, it has always 9|Page 8

It was believed that Bhutto's natural supporters and future opponents were affiliated with labor and student unions and other human rights groups. Thus they were outlawed. The press and secular, independent intellectuals, authors, and poets were targeted by political persecutors. The government, however, did not crack down on Islamic student groups like the Islami Jamiat-eTalba (IJT), which is the JI's student branch. Due to this, Islamic groups gained more support in the community than did more progressive, secular, and modern groups. The liberal arts, theatre, music, dance, and the performing arts were all seen as failing during Zia's leadership, according to many secular observers and writers13. The local fair and other types of entertainment died down as a result of Zia's efforts to Islamize the country. Religious extremists praised the state's action for enacting these regulations. JI and its student branch, IJT, had baton gangs that often attacked parties and New Year's Eve celebrations. Many of the young men felt helpless in this predicament. They had to use their wits and make do with what they found in order to make a quick getaway. Some even picked up arms and joined the jihad in Afghanistan (Hofinger and Schmidinger 2020). On the other hand, some people joined influential religious groups and eventually rose to influential positions in society that they would never have gotten otherwise. Those who would not submit and who fought back were publicly flogged or sent to jail. Secular and liberal groups have been ruthlessly persecuted by state authorities and newly emboldened hardline Islamists. Zia's Islamization drive gained pace as a result of regional and international conditions. Pakistan was ground zero in the 1980s for two wars: one against communism and another against the Iranian revolution. Conflicts between the mujahideen (holy warriors) and Soviet troops in Afghanistan were lauded by Washington and other Western capitals. The governments of Sunni Arab nations such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates are concerned about the likelihood of the Iranian revolution spreading to neighboring countries such as Pakistan. As a result, anxieties in the United States about losing influence in an oil-rich area been fully elective. This tax was deducted immediately from people's savings accounts during Zia's rule. It is thought that substantial quantities of this funds were used to assist religious organizations by the state. 12 Ushr is a religious tax levied on agricultural products. Rates vary between 10% and 5%, depending on the kind of agriculture. 13 The BBC Urdu Service presented a series of programs named Mojiza-e-fun, which included interviews 10 | P a g e

have grown (UAE). Several organizations were worried about the Iranian Revolution's impact and the spread of Khomeini's Shiite doctrine. (Bonne 2020). Therefore, they have started providing financial aid to Sunni elements in Pakistan in an effort to strengthen their organization. A new generation of fierce street fighters and jihadists who would later face off against the Soviets in Afghanistan were nurtured by the influx of Western money into religious institutions known as madrassas14. Keep in mind that these religious organizations are still teaching from a curriculum developed hundreds of years ago; they do not include any secular, modern-day topics in their curriculum, despite the fact that we are well into the twentyfirst century (Hofinger and Schmidinger 2020). In order to protect its own strategic and security objectives, the state paid little attention to the proliferation of madrassas or the quality of education they provided. The military government was strengthened by the unreformed and out-of-control madrassas that helped religious groups in civil society gain political and street influence. The religious profited, while the secular were hurt. The highest levels of church leadership capitalized on the crisis to increase their standing in the eyes of the people (Wagner and Schulz 2022). More and more foreign aid groups came to the aid of displaced Afghans in Pakistan as the number of refugees poured in. Furthermore, Pakistanis no longer have faith in the government's ability to provide even the most basic social services. This has resulted in increased interest in Pakistan from Western funders. After gaining access to Pakistan's vast foreign resources, nonprofits of all sizes quickly spread across the nation. Different NGOs have grown in stature and power in recent years. These groups worked to improve the military regime's dismal human rights record despite the regime's authoritarianism. They tried to get rid of blasphemy laws, the hudood code, and the right of minorities to vote independently but were met with strong opposition from the government and Islamic groups. The gap between non-believers and believers is at an all-time high in today's culture. The opposition parties' Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) served as a meeting 14 Madrassa institutions developed at an alarming pace throughout the 1980s and 1990s. When Pakistan got independence in 1947 11 | P a g e

ground for the gathering of secular forces advocating for the restoration of democracy and voicing fierce opposition to the dictatorship. In 1985, when there were no major political parties to choose from, the election resulted in a more polarised civil society and a boost to already powerful institutions. Tensions between religious and secular groups have stayed low as a result of Martial Law and the Islamists' greater concentration on the Afghan conflict (Malik 1997). General Zia-Ul-military Haq's administration and the policies he instituted had a profound impact on Pakistani culture despite the country's dire internal, regional, and international circumstances. There is no denying that the secular components of civil society were severely hurt by a confluence of local and international events that benefited the religious parts. On the other side, the simultaneous worldwide rise of NGOs and their international links spared the secular component of civil society from oblivion. The foundation for Afghanistan's long-term secular civil society was created by these groups, which first provided help and rehabilitation to Afghan refugees and ran minor domestic development initiatives. Asserting themselves against the state and religious rights, social organizations in Pakistan work to prevent the secularisation of public life. Zia's presidency was marked by the growth and consolidation of civil society, which drew on local and foreign support in many forms. While the specifics of various aid packages differed, a consistent thread was an emphasis on securing funding and backing from outside sources. But with backing from the state and pressure from global politics, religious components of civil society shifted the scales. Both sectors of non-profit organizations are heavily dependent on either state support or external funding to maintain their operations and growth. As a result, civic society was not a cohesive whole. Discussion Fundamentally, both Malik (1997), and Qadeer (1997), agree that it should not be subservient to the state, that it should be voluntary, that it should act as a go-between for the state and society, that it should be pluralistic and marked by competing interests, and that it should not seek to assume state power. Despite the fact that it already exists in the West, civil society is still seen as the telos, or ultimate goal, of human evolution by western establishment thinkers, according 12 | P a g e

to Kaldor (2003). When establishing their vocabulary, these researchers assume that the West's historical and political problems have been addressed. In the case of Pakistan, however, the veracity of the definitions provided by the different academics is still being debated. One might say that the religious part of Pakistani civil society meets the definitions' organizational criteria, but when the practical requirements are taken into account, a quite different image emerges. Cooperation between religious leaders seeking political power and the state seeking legitimacy or pushing the security agenda has been detrimental to those who value secular values. The gap in influence between religious and secular institutions is wide. Secular civil society relies heavily on funding from Western and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), which may cause some people to question their credibility and validity. According to the author, the collapse of Pakistani society is the outcome of interactions between the state and its institutions, regional actors, and global politics. This is a written argument presented by the author. Because it depended too much on assistance from beyond its boundaries, civil society never grew into an autonomous institution. Pakistan has a strong civil society in large part because its members are always competing for new supporters and public praise. Pakistan is an interesting case study because of the tension and activity between the two groups in the country's civil society. Last but not least, the contention between religious and secular groups in Pakistan has its origins in the country's turbulent social and political background. Both are distinct segments of society that have radically divergent beliefs and ideals. The evolving picture of Pakistani civil society is complex, fragmented, and dynamic as a result of existing conflicts and enmity between the secular and religious sectors. Vote losses are commonplace for Pakistan's religious political parties. But after becoming disillusioned with conventional political parties' inability to rejuvenate politics, the economy, and society, some people turn to religious groups in the hope of restoring Islamic order and a system of justice and equality. Conclusion In view of recent sectarian murders, hostile political climates, intolerance, and militant inclinations, many people have a right to be worried about religious extremism. The state's 13 | P a g e

complicity with its religious opponents and the inadequacies of democratic and political institutions dealt severe blows to the secular civil society. However, the impact of Western and international civic society led to a productive reformation. They have the infrastructure and expertise to move society in a more progressive and democratic direction, but they rely heavily on funding from outside the country. Its credibility in the eyes of the public and the international community is diminished as a result of its dependence on external sources for intellectual and financial resources. It has to adopt indigenous practices, take into account the social and ideological norms of Pakistani culture, and connect with locals. Because of its heavy dependence on foreign friends, Pakistan's civil society is plagued with legitimacy and sustainability issues. As soon as there is even a little shift in the political climate on any scale from the local to the global, the alliances begin to fall apart. When it came to Pakistan's civil society, both domestic and foreign allies were unreliable. This means that organizations working for the greater good in Pakistan's civil society need to do research deeper into the nation. The political fortunes of Pakistan and the globe will shape the future of the country's civil society. Presently, there seems to be a complete lack of communication between these two sectors of Pakistani society. Fighting and arguing are likely to continue for the foreseeable future. Pakistan's civil society and democratic system may be evaluated in part by looking at how well it handles the religious-secular divide. 14 | P a g e

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