The Future of Liberalism in Pakistani (for Al Burhan)

The Future of Liberalism in Pakistan This essay explores prospects for the growth and sustainability of liberal social order in Pakistan. Pakistan has been allied to the West since its first Prime Minister’s historic visit to America in 1951 and since 2001 it has been a key participant in America’s war of terror. But doubt remains about the continued sustainability of Pakistan’s ties with the West. Ultimately this depends upon the acceptance and institutionalization of liberal norms and practices in Pakistani society and state. Unless liberalism takes roots in Pakistani society and governance processes, Pakistan is a large enough country (population in excess of 180 million in 2011, PEC 2011) to detach itself strategically from the West. The geographic proximity of China and Iran underscores the viability of this option. This paper seeks to understand the process of social and state structural development in Pakistan within the context of classical liberal and Modernizations and some ‘New Sociology’ theories. Section one tries to identify the essential features of a liberal order. Section two focuses upon a brief description of the process of transition from non-liberal to liberal social and political order. We then present an analysis of social and political trends in Pakistan to assess whether liberal norms and practices are flourishing in that country and if so to what extent. The paper concludes with an assessment of forces that constrain the growth and consolidation of liberal order in Pakistan. Liberal order This section attempts to distill the essence of liberalism from the writings of Locke, Smith, Hume, Hayek, Popper, Nozick and Gray. Locke defines the liberal commonwealth as “a society of men constituted only for the procuring preserving and advancing of their own civil interests. Civil interests I call life, liberty, health and the possession of money, lands and houses. It is the duty of the magistrate by the impartial execution of equal laws to secure unto all the people in general and to every one of his subjects the just possessions of all these things . . . (A)ll civil power; right and dominion is bounded and confined to the only care of promoting these things . . . (I)t neither can nor ought to be extended to the salvation of souls”.1 Moreover the Lockean state is in a minimalist state and Locke specifically rules out the making of laws that protect “possessions from negligence and ill husbandry of possessors or from poverty or sickness” (Locke 1957 p 43-44). Adam Smith regards the market to be the primary arena in which individuals pursue Lockean “civil interests”. According to Smith since every individual “endeavors (to) employ his capital so that … it’s produce may be of the greatest value (so) every individual necessarily labours to render the annual revenue of the society as great as he can (without) intend(ing) to promote the public interest “(1976 p477). The individual is “lead by an invisible hand” to promote an end which was no part of his intention” (p477). The state should not interfere in economic affairs for “what is the species of industry which an individual capital can employ and of which the produce is likely to be of the greatest value, every individual . . . . can judge much better than any statesman or law gives” (p478). State interference with the economy “retards instead of accelerating the progress of society towards real wealth . . . (A)ll systems of preference and of restraint (should) therefore be taken away and the obvious and simple system of natural liberty establishes itself of its own accord. Every man as long as he does not violate the laws of justice is left perfectly free to pursue his own interest. The sovereign is completely discharged from . . . the duty of super tending the industry of private people and of directing it . . . according to the system of natural liberty the sovereign has only three dated . . . . protecting the society from the violence . . . three duties . . . protecting the society from the violence . . . of other independent societies . . . the duty of establishing an exact administration of justice . . . and the duty of erecting and maintaining . . . public works and institutions which it can never be for the interest of any individual to erect and maintain” (1976 p207-209).

Liberal order is thus grounded in a specific conception of justice. Hume argued that “in general it may be affirmed that there is no such passion in human minds as the love of mankind . . . a regard for the interests of mankind (can) never be the original motive of justice . . . (nor) can private benevolence (be this motive). . . We have no universal motive for observing the Laws of equity (T)he sense of justice is not derived from nature but arises artificially . . . from human conventions. “(Quoted in Aiken 1948 p53-55). These conventions are rooted in human passions. “We always consider the . . . force of the passions when we determine concerning vice and virtue . . . (o)ur sense of duty follows the . . . course of our passions” says Hume (Quoted in Aiken p.55). The liberal state constructs (through its constitution) a form of justice suited to the fulfillments of the passions of all members of liberal (civil) society. Hayek (1978) maintains that “with reference to a society of free men social justice has no meaning whatever” (1978 p74). On the other hand “rules of just individual conduct are indispensible to the preservation of a peaceful society of free men” (p74). In “a market economy there can be no distributive justice (since) in it no one distributes”. According to Hayek the working of the market is best described as ‘catalectic’ which, says Hayek, means not only bartering and exchanging2 but also “to admit into the community” (p74). ‘”The market process is a game of catalexy played according to rules and decided by superior skill . . . and chance . . . a game which serves to elicit from each player the highest worthwhile contribution to the common pool from which (he) will win an uncertain share. . .” (p76-77). Market morality requires not “the serving of known people but (the) mak(ing) of the largest gain” (p77). Market (liberal)morality sanctions distribution inequality because “(h)igh actual gains of the successful ones, whether this success is deserved or accidental is an essential element for girding resources to where they will make the largest contribution to the pool from which all draw their share” (p77-78 ). It is the victory of the obligatory abstract (morally sanctioned) rules of individual conduct over the common particular end as the method of social co-ordination which has made both the open society and individual freedom possible” (p80). Nevertheless mainstream liberals3 recognize that the market cannot govern itself and the state is “a necessary evil” (Popper 1992 p155). In Popper’s views essential state functions are (a) “protecting the right to life” (b) enable the achievement of “a fair or equitable compromise between competing interests” (c) provide a framework whereby “government can be got rid of without bloodshed” and (d) “limitations on the freedom of each which are made necessary by social life should be minimized” (1992 p 155-156). Beyond this the liberal state “cannot confer any benefits upon the citizens and enrolment be expected to do so” says Popper (1992 p155).

Popper recognizes that “a liberal utopia –– a state rationally designed on a tradition less tabula rasa –– is an impossibility” (p157). The limiting of rights4 in society must be undertaken on the basis of a tradition sanctioned “sense of justice” and an “impartial judge’s appreciation of equity” (Popper 1992 p157). Rawls, particularly in his later writings5 explored the extent to which traditions can be allowed to circumscribe liberal state practices. Nozick addresses this question more directly. He describes the liberal minimalist state as a framework for utopians, a place where people are free to join together “voluntarily to pursue and attempt to realize their own /visions of the good life . . . but where no one can impose his own utopian vision upon others . . . (the liberal) utopia is (a) meta utopia . . . in which people are free to do their own thing, the environment which must . . . to a great extent be realized first if more particular utopian visions are to be realized stably . . . utopia is a free society . . . (which) grows spontaneously from the individual choices of many people over a long period of time. The utopian process is substituted for the utopia end state . . . (the) framework which enables us to capture the best of all possible worlds as (this) only morally legitimate state treats as inviolable individuals who may not be used as tools . . . or resources . . . It treats us as persons having individual rights” (1974 p332-334). This illustrates that liberal state theory presumes the necessary existence of “the autonomous individual with his concern for liberty and privacy, the growth of wealth and the steady stream of inventions”. (Gray 1986 p82). It presumes the existence of what Gray calls “a post traditional society” (p82)6 and institutionalizes the sustained individual and social pursuit of progress –– understood as a self justifying quest for ever increasing material wealth. Critics of liberal order –– specially socialists….. have seen the essence of liberalism as its protection of private property (Arbalester 1984). Historically there has been a close association between the growth of liberalism and capitalism and even if liberal thinkers7 –– in the tradition of J.S. Mill –– have recognized grounds for income and asset redistribution measures8 there can be no liberal arguments against the institution of private property as an essential instrument for the flourishing of individual freedom. Liberal constitutions therefore usually usually provide a legal basis for the recognition of property rights and for their legitimate restriction (typically through taxation and antitrust measures). II. The transition to liberal order This eclectic and brief review of some of the writings of leading classical and contemporary liberal thinkers allows us to develop a working definition of liberal order on the basis of which we can proceed to assess (a) the extent to which existing Pakistani society and state embody liberal characteristics and (b) the prospects for the growth of liberal social and state institutions in Pakistan.

In sum a mature, liberal order may be expected to have the following characteristics. The state commits itself to and has the capability of guaranteeing the rights of life, liberty and property. The state is secular and does not concern itself with ensuring what Locke called “the Salvation of Souls”. The market is the primary arena in which individuals pursue their interests and the state refrains from influencing competitive market outcomes. Citizens are free to pursue their own interests as they see fit. State policy concerns mainly (a) the maintenance of peace (b) administering liberal justice (c) redressing market failures and absences. The administration of justice is rooted in specific conventions which define justice with reference to the fulfillment of the “passions” (i.e. interests) of citizens. Conceptions of justice are not derived from nature or from sacred texts but reflect market outcomes in which unequal distribution of rewards is a necessary means for maximizing net output. Since the market process allocates resources unequally the state must enable the achievement of a fair compromise among competing interests. Sustaining such compromises requires the functionality of a democratic process which facilitates regime change without bloodshed. Historically sanctioned traditions are capable of being interpreted within what Rawls has described as an “overlapping consensus” and the commitment to liberal constitutional rights (of life liberty and property) is socially recognized as necessary preconditions for each individual to fulfill his own life plan. Most fundamentally liberalism requires the flourishing of an individuality committed to a Kantian conception of rationality. Rationality in this conception is an instrument for the promotion of human autonomy and self determination. Kantian rationally is self interested rationality. It is the essence of the Scientific Method and Hall (1988) claims there is “a very strong identity between science and liberalism” (p9) in that both take the commands of the (Kantian) lower self as mandatory and develop a framework for the execution of these commands in a universalizable manner. The transition from pre liberal to liberal order which occurred in Europe was marked by violent upheavals such as the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the French revolution of 1789. In the twentieth century many countries –– Fascist Germany, Peronist Argentina –– have used authoritarian state structures to accelerate economic progress. Communist China remains the single most conspicuous contemporary example combining extension of marketisation of the economy with continued political authoritarianism. It is thus evident that there is no organic link between economic and political organization, countries which implement economic liberalization measures may remain politically non liberal for long stretches of time –– perhaps for “ever” (Gellner 1967, Moore 1969). Moreover the legitimating ideology of modernization is usually of a totalizing nature ––– nationalism or socialism, not liberalism (Moore 1969). Nevertheless however engineered a transition to what Gellner calls ‘industrial society’ leads to widespread adoption of the rational-scientific method in the conception and articulation of policies. It may thus be expected to provide grounds for the (eventual) emergence of liberal individuality and liberal social order. This is because an industrial society requires the use of scientific knowledge and the political dominance of a technologically skilled middle class. Industrial society requires the diffusion of scientific knowledge throughout society.

Whether the commitment to modernization of the economy will lead to a liberalization of the political order and the emergence of liberal individuality depends upon several factors Micheal Mann (1967) argues forcefully that the transition to liberal political order of modernizing economies is an accident of history and by no means inevitable. Sociologists –– specially Marxist sociologists –– have generally conceptualized the systemic transition process as an outcome of changes in the class composition of governing elites. Classes which dominate economic modernization processes may or may not support political liberalization and there is no logical or historical basis for the widely held liberal belief that “the spread of the scientific industrial complex will eventually undermine autocracy” Hall (1988 p204). Nevertheless nationalism does provide a basis for the growth of liberal political order and for this reason the desoverginization of a state through its colonial or neo colonial subjugation certainly undermines the transition process. Similarly transition to liberal political order does require the state dominance of a profit maximizing political group –– which the Marxists call a bourgeois class ––– and the acceptance of its social hegemony (in a Gramscian sense) by wage earners (the proletariat). Indeed the transition to liberal political order is facilitated by the institutionalised co-operation between management and labour.9 States committed to what Gellner designates as “liberal nationalism” are often successful within international market order –– but so are non liberal states such as contemporary China and South Korea and Taiwan during the 1980s. Participation and the quest for enhanced competitiveness within the world economy (which is governed by liberal norms, procedures and rules10) is clearly not sufficient to induce non liberal state elites to liberalise their national political systems and liberal economic policies can coexist with non liberal political decision making structures for long historical eparches and there is little systematic evidence to show that international capital and commodity market integration necessarily weakness the state power of non liberal rulers. Nor is occupation by the liberal systems global hegemon sufficient to guarantee a transition to democracy –– as evidenced by America’s recent experience in Afghanistan and Iraq. The political transition literature of the previous two decades seems to have focused more on the growth and durability of democratic institutions and process rather than on the flourishing of markets and liberal economic transaction forms. Since Rawls’ seminal contribution (1971) the majority view among (at least) liberal analysts seems to be that liberal individuality and civil society flourishes when some specific procedural and institutional arrangements become firmly established. Political liberalization requires the extension of civil liberties –– free speech, press and assembly –– to the entire citizenry (O’ Donnell and Schmitter 1988). Extension of civil liberties can occur gradually without democratization (understood as free, frequent and fair elections) as the Chinese experience since Deng’s reforms has demonstrated. Sometimes such extensions of civil liberties are seen as necessary pre conditions for a transition to democracy (Scheduler 2002). Transition to liberal order also depends on historical legacies socio cultural outlooks developmental levels and traditional governance structures (Weener 1987). The modernization literature identifies the urban middle class as the primary transitive agent to liberal order.11 Rueschemeyer (1992) on the other hand identifies the industrial working class as the most reliable democratizing agent. Ethnic diversity is identified by Hunungton (1991) and Kohle (2001) as a factor enhancing chances of transition to liberal order.12 No conclusive evidence can be presented regarding the relationship and the level, pace and structure of economic growth on the one hand and demarcatisation or liberalism of political structure on the other.13

Transition to liberal democratic order is often seen as originating from divisions within existing authoritative regimes ‘Transitology’ literature however recognizes that authoritatrian regimes can be durable (Gedder 1999). The role of civil society organizations in facilitating transition has also been emphasized (Weiss 2006) Carcothers (2002) has announced the end of this transition paradigm in recognition of the inability of its practitioners to derive general conclusions from their wide ranging examination of individual cases. Transition to democracy –– but not to liberal markets –– is impeded by the gradual de-soverginizations of nation states that has occurred due to the increased power and effectiveness of multinational corporations and international agencies such as the WTO and the IMF Held (1993 ) has argued that desoverginization of the nation state may be counter balanced by the emergence of ‘cosmopolitan democracy’. Liberalism as a global order however gains from the desoverginization of the nation state but subordination to global bureaucracies such as the EU or the WTO necessarily reduces opportunities for mass participation and representation and democratic accountabilities. Recent literature recognizes the possibility of “democratic recession” or the persistence of low quality democracy (Scheddler 2006)14. Multi party democracy has become a cover for electoral authoritarianism. ‘Rationalized authoritarianism’ may develop popular support and “performance legitimacy may trump the political legitimacy of low quality democracy” (Case2010 p105).15 The most spectacular example of democratic recession is of course the Weimer Republic where nationalist myths motivated the masses who felt alienated from the formal institutions of modern democracies (Avineri 2012). Avineri argues that in post war Europe democracy flourished because of “constraints” put or parliamentarianism, universal suffrage and multiple political parties. These ‘constraint’ took the form of recognition of trade unions collective bargaining rights, the right of unselected constitutional courts and the adoption of Keynesian macroeconomic policies. Another crucial factor according to Aveneri in the resurgence of democracy was the shift this support of the Christian right from fascist to liberal parties (Aveneri 2012). Fukuyama argues that “globalized capitalism is eroding the middle class social base on which liberal democracy rests” (2012 p53). He argues that the relationship between democracy and liberalism is contingent not necessary but the existence of a stable democratic and liberal order requires the existence of a broad middle class. The emergence of new middle classes has led to the consolidation of both liberal and democratic tendencies in countries as diverse as India, Indonesia, Brazil, South Africa and Turkey. According to Fukuyama democracy “is most broadly accepted in countries that have achieved levels of prosperity sufficient to allow the majority of their citizens to think of themselves as middle class” (p56).

Fukuyama argues that democracy as liberal ideology is hegemonic in rapidly developing and modernizing societies, but globalism and technological charge undermine liberal hegemony by “(making) it impossible for more than a minority of citizens . . . to achieve middle class status” (2012 p58). This happens because technological change and globalization fuel “immiserising” growth –– growth which benefits the very rich massively.16 The literature on modernization and transitology is vast but somewhat out dated.17 Other authors such as Skocpol (1979) and Evans (1995) have revived state centric Modernization theroy. In contrast to society and state centric approaches authors such as Landes (1998) and Meade (1964) stress the role of value transformation at the individual level in the growth of liberal order.18 The liberal individual respects autonomous intellectual activity and according to Almond and Verba (1963) has a specific political orientation which allows him to be a “participant” rather than a “subject” or a “parochial” spectator in the political process.19 In a “participant” political culture citizens allocations are seem as “rights” not as “duties” and these “rights” are derived from popular sovereignty (not from divine will). A liberalizing order may be defined as one in which “participants” predominate and in which individual interests determine the conception of public good. In “traditional political culture” social and family ties are predominant and social hierarchies are well entrenched Liphart (1999) describes participatory political culture as consensual rather than customary Political culture is seen as a “mind state” (Elkins and Simeon (1979) which defines legitimate political choices.20 Inglebert et al (2004) distinguishes between “post materialist” and “materialist” political cultures. According to him, liberalization requires a prioritization of “post materialist” (liberal rights preferred over material benefits) values with individualist orientation. A “traditional” political culture espousing materialist values provides little hope for liberalization. Typically such political cultures nurture “subject” individualities. Parochial political cultures may have strong ethnic / nationalist moorings. Greenfield (1992) argues that nationalism, such as that of the United States, can be individualist in that the state is seen as an instrument for the promotion / protection of liberal rights. As noted above ethnic national fragmentation is seen both as a hindrance to the growth of liberal order (Welch 1993) (Rabuskka and Shepsle 1972) and as a stimulant for the growth of tolerance and liberal rights, (Hardgrave 1993.)21 Liberal order is expected to flourish in a widely differentiated social structure with relatively autonomous social classes (Huntington 1984) and in societies in which associational groups are independent of the state and unite people from different cultural and religious strata on the basis of their self interests. The relationship between liberal political and liberal economic order is problematic Market logic may constrain the sovereignty of popular will as the post 2007 crises have illustrated.22 Moreover market order feeds the growth of socio economic inequality. This may undermine liberal democracy and its “associational” foundations may be overwhelmed by economic groups (such as those involved in the Occupy Wall street movement of 2011). The growth of inequality weakness civil society and liberal values of tolerance, and willingness to compromise destroying social capital and trust (Putman 1993). Interest group pluralism has also been seen as undermining democracy.23

The sustenance of liberal political order may also be constrained by global forces. This is particularly important for peripheral capitalist states such as Pakistan and Greece.24 The more “open” (i.e. liberal) a peripheral state the greater the likelihood that its national sovereignty is eroded by global market imperatives articulated through the agencies of global capital such as the IMF, WTO, EU and the Manhattan based rating agencies. Democracy is increasingly being thrust upon peripheral regimes through human rights enforcement initiatives of the United States.25 Such initiatives may be overt as in Iraq and Afghanistan or covert as in the case of Pakistan (2007-08) where the United States (in association with Saudi Arabia) managed what Huntington calls “a transplacent” of the Musharaf regime through negotiations between the generals and opposition camps. Imperialist sponsored transplacement usually does not lead to the emergence of full blooded democracy but to a “hybrid” system combining elections with authoritarian traits (Levsky and Way 2002). Imperialist sponsorship of liberal order in Asia and Africa is of course a long standing tradition.26 The local elite in the Subcontinent “mimicked” British institutions (parliamentary, administrative, judicial etc). British colonial rule also had a divisive impact on some ethnic groups (Punjabis, Gurkhas were preferred British partners). Post colonial rule has strengthened external influences on domestic politics. Globalization of capitalist order involves an integration of peripheral economies within global liberal market order –– through trade, finance, technology flows as well as the expanded role of agencies such as the IMF and the WTO. As noted above this undermines state sovereignty and may intensify ethnic conflict within peripheral states.27 The impact external factors have on the evolution of domestic political order has increased significantly during the post Cold War era. The “new political sociology” literature reflected in what Taylor (2010) designates as “the cultural turn” the “global turn” and the “complexity turn” has raised questions about the sustainability of liberal order and the universality of the transition process which is expected to culminate in the establishment and consolidation of a liberal democracy. This “new political sociology” is a critique of Modernist political sociology in that it expresses an incredulity about the latter’s universalist claims. It does not however transcend Modernist political sociology by presenting different values (something in place of freedom, equality and progress) or alternative meta-narratives.28 it shifts the focus of attention to identity politics, (“ the politics of difference”), the emergence of a global civil society the gradual de-sovereignization of the nation state, and the non linear, patterned chaotic causation process determining social and political outcomes in post modernity. Particularly interesting is the conception of the recomposition of the nation state as a key node of an expanding network of global governance as well as the ‘gamekeeper’ role of the state in controlling unpredictable global flows (of refugees, money, media, images and technology). Equally salient is the New Political Sociology’s conception of “de centered citizenship” which has become fragmented and subjected to multiple sources of identification29 (specially deterotorialisation). These ‘complex’ identities inhabit the space between the global and the local. Fragmentation is also evident in the emergence of non instrumental30 and non heirchical social movements. The new political sociology literature contrasts these ‘new social movements’ with ‘networks of terror’ seen as a product of post modernity but violently intensifying global chaos.31

Does ‘post panopticism’, globalization and complexification pose a challenge to the sustenance of liberal order specially in peripheral capitalist countries such as Pakistan.32 This question has been raised mainly in the context of Latin America (Lopez Maya 2008). Liberal ideological hegemony is undermined by the delegitimation of liberalism’s universalist maxims and claims. As liberal rationality is challenged liberal governmentablity may become vulnerable. Complexification of identities through increased salience of race and religion may undermine liberal citizenship. In Foucault’s term ‘power-knowledge’ systems may become available which provide opportunities for effective resistance and undermine the processes by which the projects of subject individuals and groups become aligned with those of the rulers,. Reflexive self organization may fuel effective resistance especially at the cultural level. Moreover liberalism (in sharp contrast to anarchism) has always been a state ideology and the de-sovereignization of the nation state may delegitimate liberal national governance processes. Globalization ‘hollows out’ national governments especially in peripheral states by both external free flow of information, commodities, technology and finance and internal marketization and privatization processes. It increases the dependence of national governments on global policy networks, such as international organizations, rating agencies the military strategists of the hegemon and regional governmental structures. Internally as Jessop (1997) has printed out ‘governance’ subverts government and there is increased reliance on ‘contracting out’, decentralization of budgetary control and reliance on (usually) foreign consultants. However in as much as globalization is a globalization of capitalist order it is also an endorsement of some core liberal principles of government. The global system provides both ideological and physical resources for nation states. Globalization strengthens the world order principles according to which liberal structures are designed. Globalization provides resources for empowering liberal national elites and may undermine the authority of their rivals. Post modern political order is characterized by institutionalized pluralism and financialization which Bauman(1992) describes as a “form of neo medievalism”. This may weakens state authority. As the new social movements undermine class and ethnic identities they pose an ideological challenge to the liberal / social democratic states, as do the fundamentalist movements which have emerged in the post modern era. Both types of movements delegitimize33 the universal conception of citizenship endorsed by liberals. Thus that integration into ‘global order’34 is expected to pull both ways –– i.e. strengthen liberal democracy by nation state subordination to global laws and decision making procedures (specially economic) and weaken it by exposing the liberal nation state by exposing it to postmodern pressures such as identity politics and the growth of new social and fundamentalist movements.

III. Liberalizing Pakistan? Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of individuals, societies and states that are mainly regarded (in the literature reviewed above) as conducive to the growth of liberal economic and political order. Table 1: Individual Societal and State Characteristics Conducive to the Growth of Liberal Economic and Political Order Individual Society State Value transformation from religious to secular Social dominance of the scientific method Liberal nationalism Participative attitude to politics Social dominance of a technologically skilled middle class Co-operation between labour and capital Individualist orientation Social dominance of the bourgeoisie Growth of democratic institutions and civil liberties. Preference for Post materialist values (a) Participation in global markets (b) Divisions within authoritarian regimes Mind set defining individual autonomy as legitimate political choice Ethnic diversity or homogeneity (c) Integration into cosmopolitan democracy (e) Growth of global cosmopolitan identity (h) Social salience of association groups as against family or kin. Relative social equality (d) Lack of material performance legitimacy of non liberal regimes. Transition process (f) The recomposition of the state as “a node” of global governance (g) through adherence to liberal governance principles of human rights and this market economy. Provision of aid by the global system. Globalization weakening non liberal elites The acceptance of materialist values serves as an impediment to the growth of a liberal polity if it confers “performance legitimacy” on authoritarian ruler. If this is accompanied by subordination to global agencies such as the IMF, the WTO and the EU this may reduce national sovereignty and thus reduce both scope and enthusiasm for popular participation in the national political process. The literature is divided on the role of ethnic diversity as impediment or stimulant for democratic transition. This is seen by some authors as impeding the growth of liberal market order which is normally monopolistic and not perfectly competitive. This may undermine national sovereignty and thus also undermine the rationale for popular participation in the democratic process. “Transplacement” rather than “transformation” or “replacement” is expected to lead to more effective and long lasting transition to liberal political order. This might either strengthen liberal elites (especially if it leads to economic progress or weaken them if the ‘de sovereiginization of this state’ leads to a relative disempowerment of liberal citizenship. This might delegitimize traditional (e.g. Islamic) value systems but might also fragment and decompose liberal citizenship. There is a tension involved in the social liberalization process “an endemic conflict between the growth of capitalist markets and democratic politics” (Stbeck 2011 p6). Liberal order is correctly seen as a political economy ruled by two conflicting principles of resource allocations. Markets allocate resources on the basis of the ‘principle of marginal productivity’35 but states seek to ‘distort’36 this resource allocation pattern by subjecting it to the collective choices of democratic politics. These two principles very rarely align automatically but liberal governments are expected to honor both.37 In countries such as Pakistan where a sizeable proportion of the population experiences both absolute and rising relative poverty conflicts between market orientation on the one hand and rights orientation on the other of liberal social order may be acute. In Pakistan the government which has deliberately sought a reconciliation of the imperatives of ‘markets’ and ‘rights’ allocation strategies is that of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (1972-77).38 Authoritarian regimes (1958-69), (1999-2008) have suspended democratic process to consolidate liberal market order.39

I propose to assess liberalism’s progress and prospects in Pakistan by focusing on the following questions: To what extent has social order been subjected to the operation of the ‘marketization’ and the rights’ principles.40 To what extent has such subjugation become socially legitimized. In terms of Table 1 answering question I will require assessments of the social dominance of a technologically skilled middle class which makes national policy choices41 and of the bourgeoisie42, integration within global markets and the form of this integration, the politics of ethnic-nationalism, the social dominance of associational groups in Pakistani civil society (as against that of kinship), the extent and form of inequality, capital labour relations, access to constitutionally granted liberal rights, authority of democratic institutions and the nature of transition from authoritarian to representatives regimes (1971,1988,2008). With respect to question 2 , the following factors indentified in Table 1 will be assessed: secularization of values, individual attitude to politics (participative or otherwise), individualist or collective, “post materialist” concerns, grounds for assigning political legitimacy, prevalence of kinship and tribal /orientation and social salience , the ‘ideology of Pakistan’ the extent of performance legitimacy of authoritarian regimes and the social legitimacy of democratic institutions and of initiatives for integrating Pakistan with the global cosmopolitan democratic order. III.1 Identity: Pakistan is an urbanizing society. The share of the urban sector in the total population has risen from 28.4 percent in 1981 to 36.9 percent in 2011 (PES 2011 App Table 12.2). Nevertheless, kinship tribal and class consciousness remains predominant (Lieven 2011)43. This is interwoven with consciousness of imagined communal association with the world community of Muslims. There is a potential (sometimes realized) tension between kinship/ tribal identification on the one hand and Islamic identification on the other –– it was the historic mission of the Chishtiya and Qadria sufi silsilahs to harmonize these identities44. Caste and (to a lesser extent) tribal value systems reflect their origins in ancient Indian traditions and are thus relatively closer to Hinduism than to Iranian or Arab culture.45 They thus endorse hierarchy, social fragmentation and particularism and represent a passive (often unconscious) resistance to Modernist universalist discourses and practices. The Islamic consciousness of the typical Pakistani is passive expressed in a formal acceptance of Islam as a value legitimating framework but also accepting the necessity of deviating from Islamic norms in social practice.46 Islamic identification finds expression in acts of emotional fervor –– gatherings, of the tablighi Jama’at and Dawat-i-Islami, anti Ahmadi riots the murder of the governor of Punjab in 2011.47 etc –– not in the articulation of state building projects. As Sinha and Triputhi (1994) have pointed out in the case of India there is a flexibility and a fluidity between the conception of the self and that of the other. Individualism are does not flourish in traditional Indian or Pakistani culture. Social interdependence is high and the sense of social powerlessmess is deep and there is a strong urge to participate in power networks and to accept subordination (Gilani 1985).

A streak of militarism characterizes typical Pakistani individuality (Akhund 2000 p17). There is a widespread inclimination to accept conspiracy theories. Group identification is so strong that violating religious and legit obligations for benefiting the kinship group is seen as morally justifiable (Leiven p103). Both the tendency to emotive self expression and submissiveness are fostered by the structure of the typical Pakistani family “where the father is an absent figure (and there is) great intimacy with the mother” (Gilani 2002 p54-55). The Pakistani male sees himself primarily as a son and the Pakistani female is essentially a mother (Kakar 1978). The psychological need for the presence of a saviour figure is expressed in the mass following of the pirs. The individual murid’s (disciple) relationship with the pir is essentially emotional and the pir’s policies are endorsed on the basis of his presumed personal infallibility.48 The infallibility of the charismatic saviour is an inspirited trait –– party leadership49 as well as silsillah leadership routinely passes from father to son to grandson. Value change has been slow in Pakistan and although society has been segmented into what Qadeer calls the “traditional, the Islamist and the modern” “the overwhelming majority of Pakistanis are traditional (2009 p87)”. Islam has always been at the core of Pakistan’s national culture (Qadeer 2009 p94)50 and direct challenges to Islamic value systems at the mass level have usually been defeated.51 On the other hand traditional Islamic practices have been seen as impediments to the acceptance of revolutionary Islamic ideology (Leiven 2011 p19) Islam’s cultural strength is however diluted by its political weakness. The mainstream Islamic parties demand for a comprehensive Islamization of all aspects of national life has never enjoyed popular support. This is reflected not just in their small share of the vote in all national elections (with the exception of 2002) but in their election manifestos which are virtually indistinguishable from that of secular parties. The Muthaida Majlis-e-Amal’s52 performance in Khyber Pakhtunkhawa’s provincial government during 2002-2008 posed no threat to secular order53 despite some symbolic gestures similar to those of Bhutto in 1974 and 1977, Zia in 1979 and 1985 and Nawaz Sharif in 199854. The ability of the mainstream Islamic parties to launch mass protest movements has declined55 as evident in the failed ‘Go America Go’ movement which the newly elected Amir of the Jama’at-i-Islami tried to launch in 2010. The main mass expression of Deobandi orthodoxy has taken the form of sectarianism. Sectarianism does not exist at the community level. Shias and Sunnis inter marry and share the same language and culture. Shia and Sunni / Deobandi identities are not oppositional and ideologically –– Shias and Sunni Deaobandis do not have varying conceptions of Islamic order and values. That is why Shia parties have been always constituents of the MMA and of the recently formed Tahrik-Nifaz-i-Shariat56 Shias have participated in all mass movements lead by the mainstream Islamic parties.57 The emergence of sectarian groups is partially a consequence of the state elite’s attempt to enlist the support of segments of the orthodox Islamic parties.58 Sectarianism is a secular phenomenon in that it flourishes on the basis of a sense of material deprivation Abu Zahab has described “sectarian militancy . . . as a reaction to a growing sense of insecurity and hopelessness (among) marginalized and uprooted people (suffering) extreme poverty” (2002 p59-60). It is an expression of anger against structures of power which are seen as discriminating in favor of rival groups. Thus Maulana Zia ul Qasmi then chairman of the supreme council of a leading sectarian formation in Pakistan, the Sipah-i-Sahaba has said “The government gives too much importance to the Shias. They are everywhere . . . in senior positions . . . the jobless Sunni youth find all doors closed” (Jung (Urdu) 17/11/09). Sectarian ulema emphasize minor theological differences to safeguard community economic allegiances.

Like sectarianism (which as a significant identity marker is largely confined to sothern Punjab and north eastern Khyber Pakhtunkhawa) ethnic conscious is also a modernizing phenomenon. It is much more widespread and with the notable exception of the Punjab and Azad Kashmir is a strong identity marker everywhere else. This is largely a consequence of the inherent incoherence of Muslim nationalism ––– ‘the ideology of Pakistan’ ––– which galvanized popular support during the independence struggle (roughly 1937-1947).59 Ethnic consciousness has emerged mainly as a consequence of “the ill success of the original aim of Pakistan” (Mumtaz 2002 p-46) in Sindh.60 Provincial national consciousness is rooted in a consciousness of economic deprivation against Punjab in East Pakistan, Baluchistan and Sindh61 and has benefited from the ineffectiveness of provincial devolution measures (such as the failure of the special concessions contained in the ‘Baluchistan package’ of 2010 and 2011). The transformation of Sindhi, Mohagir and Baloch communities into self conscious ethnic groups is primarily a response to a growing consciousness of economic deprivation.62 As Gambousky stressed in his classic study (1964) nationalities in Pakistan did not see themselves as nations during the independence movement or its aftermath and the development of ethnic-national consciousness is a relatively recent phenomenon (post 1970). Currently only the Baloch nationalists advocate the breakup of the state of Pakistan. 63 If ethno-nationalism is (as argued above) primarily a phenomenon sustained by economic factors then the fact that most ethno nationalities are widely regionally dispersed (sizable Baluch communities in Sindh, Mohajirs in Punjab and Peshawar, Pathans in Karachi) invalidates secessionist aspirations. Religious and sectarian consciousness also dilute ethnic consciousness and its secessionist expression.64 Ethno nationalist movements seem principally concerned with the capture of state resources for their community rather than with seccesion.65 The growth of sectarian and ethno nationalist identities pose serious delegitimizing challenges to Islamic consciousness and in this sense facilitate Pakistan’s modernization. However, attitude of sectarian and ethno nationalist movement, liberalization of society and state remains instrumentalist.66 There political and social organizations remain rigidly authoritarian (as so do all political parties in Pakistan)67 but they remain perfectly willing to participate in liberal governance processes if this materially benefits them. A modernizing culture is seem to exist in the top echelon of the economic formation “Managers” are said to have a distinct lifestyle which are however “symbolically” linked to traditional lifestyles (essentially through extended family and kinship networks (Qadeer 2006). Traditions are being “grafted into modernity” through this linkage and a process of pragmatic reinterpretation of traditions and norms which continue to anchor all aspects of daily life is underway. According to Qadeer a Pakistani brand of modernity is being gradually crafted by “managers” in top social echelons along with their subordinates –– professionals (specially lawyers.68) NGO workers, academics etc. This ‘modernization with Pakistani characteristics’ is partially endorsed by Islamic fundamentalists and traditionalists69 in its political but not in its social and cultural manifestation. The process of modernization in Pakistan is thus “hopscotch” (Qadeer’s term) producing “lopsided” and “unbalanced” change.

Pakistan’s modernizing elite remains integrated within kinship networks which are seen as having immense strength and flexibility in Pakistani society Elite individuals remain committed to enhance the resources of their kin. Kinship loyalty trumps loyalty to a profession or a to the state. This dilutes the modernizing impact of the elites social and state projects and policies. Qadeer avoids class analysis and speaks in terms of “lifestyle” but modernizing lifestyles are available only to relatively small social income groups –– for convenious we will call them “classes”.70 Estimates of the share of the ‘upper class’ in the total population in 2011 range from 0.1 percent to 37.7 percent. The share of the middle class is estimated as ranging from 1.8 percent to 60 percent.71 Using an “expanded middle class” concept Durr-e-Nayyab estimated the middle class to be about 61 million in 2010.72 This is an over-estimate and tells us little about the value orientation of middle class individuals –– for “lifestyle” is measured only with reference to possession of consumer goods73 (Durre Nayyab 2011 p10). Durre Nayyab’s sub categorization shows that 64 percent of the middle class includes those who are “vulnerable” (42 percent) and “aspirant” (23 percent middle class members). As against this “the hard core” middle class includes only 4.3 percent of the category total (2011 p12) thus s realistic estimate of the middle class would be about 2.6 million (about 1.5 percent of the population Core.74 middle class families are most likely to be headed by professionals and service workers. (2011 p24-25). Rising inequality has been a feature of Pakistan’s development pattern. The Gini coefficient has risen during the 1990s and 2000s and the income share of the lowest population quartile has fallen. Moreover growing inequality is more marked in the urban segment of the economy SPCD 2001 p153). The growth of a liberal post liberal identity is thus likely to remain constrained by the exclusion of a large majority from participation in reaping the benefits of economic progress. This might not inhibit the growth of a modern ‘protest’ identity –– committed to e.g. ethno nationalism, socialism or sectaricinism75 -- spurred by a desire to appropriate a larger share of economic benefits. As argued below liberal rights have been formally available to citizens –– and military regimes have not generally restricted civil rights appreciably. Similarly economic liberalism has provided the raison d’etre of state policy for the last three decades.76 Market and state liberalization are widely seen as insufficient for popular improvement (Zaidi 2009).77 If a modernist identity is to flourish in Pakistan it is therefore not likely to be a liberal identity. The use of liberal structures and policies for achieving ethno national or sectarian purposes however may become politically entrenched.78 III.2 Society The impetus for the development of a modern identity are thus primarily economic. But Pakistani society has been described as “savage unchecked and unregulated by public virtue . . . subordin(ating) public tasks to private aggrandizement …….. primitive accumulation without obligation” (Pasha 2002 p20). While a market economy has grown and its associated rights have been formally granted the landlord elite has been reluctant to abandon social relations of personal dependence of the haris on the waderas. In Pasha’s view the state has not “guaranteed” civil society allowing it to become savage –– and therefore less civil / liberal “Non westernized social forces” challenge subsumption within globalizing social order. The “mystique of westernization” has been “disenchanted”. The middle class is a particular focus of modernizations and this class “perceives itself to be quite skilled in positioning itself to modernity on its own terms” (2002 p35.)79 However its inability to act as an effective modernizing agent is reflected in its inability to practice a new coherent social morality “self seeking has (become) an integral element of both society and state” (2002 p38) –– reflecting strong kinship patronage linkages of the elites. Modernization of values may be seen to be primarily a consequence of this growing autonomy of the economic sphere from both society and the state.80

The “autonomy” of the economy81 does not derive from its rapid growth. Pakistan remains the slowest growing national economy in South Asia. During 2008-2011 real GDP grew at an annual rate of just 2.6 percent per annum and per capita income was almost stagnant. Average annual fixed investment growth during this period was negligible just 0.6 percent per annum. Inflation averaged about 16 percent, manufacturing sector growth was negative. The large scale manufacturing sector’s share of the total labour force is small and falling. The technological intensity of Pakistan exports is much lower than that of India82 (Ansari 2008). The marketization of the economy has mainly been driven by trade and finance. The services sector now accounts for 53.3 percent of GDP. The employment elasticity of large scale manufacturing has been low and there has been little structural change with in it (Sayeed 2002).83 Total factor productivity growth has been extremely sluggish during the last three decades (Wizarat 2003). Industrial growth has lagged behind urban growth fuelling the expansion of both the salariat84 and slum dwellers While the later have shown no signs of constituting “a class in itself” the salariat and the professionals (particularly the military and the civilian bureaucracy) have emerged as aspirant transformational agents in Pakistani society and state. Their transformation capability is restricted however due to their embedness with all comprehension kinship patronage networks. According to Ilham Niaz (2010) however their’s has not been a “modernizing” role. These groups85 along with feudal lords constitute Pakistan’s ‘governing elite’. This elite has deliberately destroyed “the State of Law” created by the British and reverted to the political culture of the Mughal empire (which Niaz describes as “bureaucratic”). National security, democracy and development discourses have been used by this elite to legitimize this process retrogression. This may be interpreted to be a retreat from liberal norms and structures to the extent to which the colonial British Indian “State of Law” is seen to incorporate elements of liberal order. The Pakistani governing elite has fostered “a culture of power closely correspond(ing) to the highly arbitrary, propertied and ideocratic pattern of commercial bureaucratic empires” (Niaz 2010 p275). Pakistan’s governing elite has deliberately “subverted and destroy(ed) the structure, ethos and discipline of the state” (p275). The rulers (have) become increasingly isolated from the legal, psychological and cultural inhibitions of the British period(p275). The governing elite –– “mandarins, praetorians, divans” –– have a “fractured mentality” articulating a development / democratic rhetoric on the one hand but a “medieval” authoritarian and arbitrary state craft on the other. In Niaz’s account none of the ruling groups are seen as bearers of liberal values.86 The social origins of the higher civil bureaucracy have recently being studied by Ahmad (2009). Most have post graduate ‘liberal arts’ degrees. Most come from urban areas and are sons and daughters of salaried professionals but the majority have not been educated at elite schools. They can be classified as ‘middle middle’ class on the basis of their fathers’ income (Durre Nayyab 2011). As against this entrants to Army commissioned (i.e. higher) ranks during 1973-98 (according to the some survey) have a slightly lower urban orenation.87 Most have graduate level education from non elite schools. They come from relatively lower income families and less than 40 percent army officers are sons of professionals.

The military services are reputed to be the best organized formations in Pakistan (Nawaz 2011 p81). The army has “learned to use Islamist parties to fight internal populist leaders” (p82). The military has been described as ‘predatory’ prioritizing its own economic interest over the national interest (Siddiqa 2007). Attempts at value change within the ranks and officers have been frequent but indeterminate.88 Nawaz has noted that the secular nationalist officer cadre recruited under Ayub, with experience of advanced training in America are currently (2010) on the verge of retirement and the Zia, “Islamist” officers are about to take command (Nawaz 2011 p90). They will soon be followed by the Musharaf “enlightened modernists” who have enjoyed privileged access to the American military establishment. The muted tussle between “fundamentalist” Islamic and modernizing secularist-nationalist factions within the Pakistani military may be expected to continue. There is no evidence however that the later faction is more willing than the former to subject itself to civilian over-sight and control. The military cannot serve as an instrument for liberalizing Pakistani state and society (although it can play a modernizing role).89 As the recruitment pattern of the officer cadre shifts from the upper to the lower middle class authoritarian tendencies may be expected to strengthen (Shafqat 2011 p 95) and the military’s dominance of Pakistan’s defense and foreign policy is not likely to be subjected to democratic pressure in the near future. The elite civil bureaucracy (like its military counterpart) is also unlikely to be an enthusiastic advocate of liberalization. The Pakistan civil service is in a state of decline and the recruitment pattern has shifted from the upper to the “middle” middle class since 2001 the preferred career choice of the new elite civil service has been the Police. This reflects the preference for authoritarian values of the new elite service entrants and the strengthening of clientalist political networks. A technocratic elite faction within the higher bureaucracy has emerged. This faction typically manages USAID and ADB funded projects in the public sector but their relative isolation from Pakistani culture (as reflected in their life styles) is likely to impede their contribution to social liberalization. Nor has the political elite shown a practical commitment to liberal values. Major political parties – the People’s Party, the Muslim League (s), the Awami National Party –have dynastic leadership structures. The political leadership is dominated by landowners dynastic pirs90, tribal leaders and a few tycoons. Political parties are in decay and organizationally weakning91 with no clear programmes. Procedural dimensions of democracy have been resurrected from time to time but there subsequent dismemberment has evoked no mass resentment. Liberal democratic values –– individual freedom, rule of law, social consensus seeking –– have weak social roots among both the masses and the elite(s). An internal democratic culture is not evolving. The present political compromise between the PPP the PML(N), the ANP and the MQM is a US construct (Shafqat 2011 p199-201).

This is graphically illustrated by the fact that most human rights violations are committed not by state authorities but by community organizations such as jirgas, and panchayiats on the basis of community consensual decisions “Free lance” brutality by police officers, landlords (waderas) and sardars is not usually authorized by the state and is widely socially accepted and tolerated (Lieven 2011 p25). Pakistani elites do not commit themselves to an overarching conception of social purpose. Instead Niaz (2010) seeks to show through a plethora of examples that policies have been chosen by Pakistani elites on the basis of their individual short term interests. In Sen.’s view (2009 p291-2 439-40) liberal governance needs to reflect the assumptions of Social Choice not Public Choice theory Liberal states consistently promote liberal rights (property, association, legal impartiality expression –– i.e. ‘human’ rights) and constrain economic, social and political practices which violate these rights Pakistani elites have not done this but have instrumentalized liberal structures to promote their own individual interests,. The Pakistani elites do not articulate the rationality that liberal social and political organization requires. Nor is there any reason to expect them to base their policies on the rational choices that liberalization requires in the foreseeable future. Social Choice theory pre supposes the existence of social collectivities –– nations, classes, sects, interest groups –– to the welfare of which individual preferences may be subordinated. In our view national, sectarian and religious identities in Pakistan remain weak and their political practices are incoherent and contradictory. What of class? Marxist authors from Sajjad Zaheer (1980) and Humza Alavi (1972) onwards have sought to explain policy choices in terms of class interests. The most systematic evidence presented has been in the case of the large landlord class acting as a ‘class in itself’ but the classes that traditionally have sought liberal and social democratic rights, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, do not seem to have acquired a district class identity. The commitment of the bourgeois to liberal norms and practices has been almost nonexistent. As Imran Ali notes “business has remained quite peripheral any stimulus from the business sector to develop political institutions or democratic political organizations or to initiate effective institutional reforms (have) remained weak at best” (Ali p 119-120).92 The business community articulates strong religious and nationalist sentements93 and typically seeks not an expansion of market reforms and liberal rights but concessions and special favours from the government.94 Industrial and financial sector tycoons are fully integrated into the kinship patronage social structures and thus both unable and unwilling to espouse system destabilizing initiatives. Organized labour is an insignificant social force. In 2009-10 the civilian labour force equaled 33 percent of the population and employment has grown at the annual average rate of about half the population growth rate during 2006-2011. Urban employment growth has been less than 1 percent in each year of the 2006-2011 period –– the urban share of the total labour force is still only 30 percent and stagnant for the last three years. Only 35 percent of the employed are wage earners (“employees”). Two thirds are self employed or family workers. 73 percent of the total non agricultured labour force work in the informal sector. Real wages have been declining for over a decade (FPCCI 2011 p79) and union density is low.95 The PPP started off as social democratic party but the first Benazir Government (1988-91) changed course. While labour legislation in 2008 and 2010 incorporates rights of collective bargaining and strike action, in practice the bargaining power of organized labour remains extremely weak and industrial action is almost always unsuccessful.96 Out of a total workforce of about 30 million unionized labour amounts for only about 15,000 (less than 0.1 percent) (Siddique and Ansari 2006).

Associations play an inconsequential role in Pakistani society which is denominated by kinship patronage networks (Noman 2002) p167-171). “(L)oans are given on the basis of (family) alliances . . . public institutions have become symbols of arbitrariness and the whimsical exercise of power . . . Institutional breakdown is evident (everywhere) institutions are subject to a partisan onslaught” (Noman 2002 p178) However since 1980s. NGOs have emerged on a large scales basis in Pakistan. They have also been active in human rights advocacy (Pasha et al 2007).97 In 2007 OF 45,000 NGOs with full time paid staff of about 264,000, sixty four percent were working in the education sector and human rights advocacy (including gender related issues). Since the passage of the Kerry Logar bill in the United States the Pakistani government has accepted that foreign donor funding can directly be accessed by all NGOs. Before this, foreign funding remained small –– thus in 2007 foreign funding amounted to just 6 percent of NGO revenue in the John Hopkins study sample (Baqir 2009 p99). This group include mainly “modernizing” (i.e. non religious NGOs).98 One of the most well known leaders of the NGO movement in Pakistan sees the NGO as “in conflict with the more traditional social forces” (Noman2002 p279) specially on issues such as deployment of nuclear power and press freedom. Some number of NGOs were deregistered by the Nawaz Sharif government. NGOs enjoyed rapid growth during Musharaf’s era but most seek to present themselves as democratizing agents. The typical NGO in Pakistan is however not a people’s organization. It is usually dominated by a leading organizer and financier.99 However two major NGO initiatives –– the Agha Khan Rural Support Programme (AKRSP) and the Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) –– have sought to democratically organize the beneficiary communities (Baqir 2009) and the currently operative government Income Support and Youth Employment programmeS are consciously modeled on of AKSP and OPP. Advocacy NGOs have been seen as partners for combating militant Islam by USAID and some Scandinavian donors (HaqqanI 2008) USAID has worked actively to build an NGO coalition at the national level. NGO success in value transformation remains limited due to the low literacy rate in the country and strong kinship religious moorings of family life. The role of the Islamic NGOs is particularly ambiguous because Islamic modernism has not been effectively legitimized (Ahmed 1998). Nevertheless NGO pressure has been effective in tackling gender, environmental and minority rights issues (Khan2002). Their “democratization” potential is however insignificant and they have found it equally easy to work both with military and civilian governments. The most significant new social movement (NSM) in terms of its social transformative potential has been the women’s movement which originated in early reaction to the Zia regime’s Islamization initiatives in the 1980s. It is a typical NSM –– lacking an organizational focus nonrepresentational, leaderless, spontaneous, agitative. It is a force for social liberalization and its main achievement has been the widespread acceptance of ‘women’s rights’ as a legitimate value by all sections of the political elite –– including Islamic traditionalists.100 According to Weiss (2002) ‘traditional’ women are increasingly willing to take on outside the house work and most ‘traditional’ women have discarded the ‘burqa’. The female labour force participation rate has grown at a modest rate during the past decade –– from 13.7 percent in 1999 – 2000 to 21.9 percent in 2009-10101 but economic deprivation is probably a much more important cause of this than any influence of the women movement’s organization or discourse.

Women’s rights groups –– the Women’s Action Forum(WAF), the War Against Rape (WAR) –– have proliferated in recent years. These are not feminist movements (contesting patriarchy) but are principally agitating for liberal rights. These rights are increasingly recognized in principles but social and economic practices do not articulate them–– these rights are usually violated on the basis of community consensual decisions. The women’s movement has not “touched women’s personal lives” (Shaheed 2002 p344). Religious identification has not been reduced by rights rhetoric or growing economic participation (Shaheed 2002 p365).102 Women are more observant of religious obligation than men.103 Recognizing this organizations such as WAF have sought to legitimize their opposition to the Shariat by Islamic references (Sumar 2002). The women’s movement in Pakistan must thus be seen as focused on negotiating a “better deal” for women through an expansion of their liberal rights. Despite the fact that the intellectual leadership of the women’s movement espouses modernist and post modernist values104 its social transformational impact has been limited. However the liberalizing impact and commitment of the women’s movement is significantly greater than that of other identitarian movements (ethno nationalist, sectarian). Overall Pakistani social order is resistant to changes due to a deeply entrenched kinship patronage structure which links large landlords, business leaders and political and community bosses. It also links the elite to the masses who benefit from elite patronage. Urbanization has not lead to a dilution of the influence of traditional Islam or traditional elites because new and old segments remain strongly socially connected through their villages. Pakistani communities espouse non liberal preferences which prevail often over elite policies –– this is reflected in the social dominance of the communal justice (jirga/panchayat) systems which constrains the implementation of state law and the communally sanctioned violation of human rights which the state is unable to prevent. In Leiven’s view jirgas and panchayats are “the only democratic institutions in Pakistan” (2011 p 110-112) –– and these obstruct liberal social practices. In Pakistan power is conferred on individuals in relations to their access to kinship – patronage networks, spiritual authority and wealth. Liberalizing initiatives undermine the power of elite groups. Moreover the Taleban insurgency demonstrates the social potential for accepting anti-liberal values and practices. According to Leiven young mullas have effectively replaced the local landowners and tribal leadership (maliks) in the federally administered tribal areas (FATA). The Taliban are seen as “friends of the poor” and the Islamic judicial system (‘nezam-i-adl’) enacted in these areas in 2009 enjoys wide popular support not just in FATA but throughout the country (Leiven 2011 p426-431,456,467). III.3 The State: Modernist / post modernist value discourses have affected Pakistan’s governing elites. Political liberalism has been Pakistan’s official creed enshrined in all-three constitutions, all of which present a liberal interpretation of Islamic political norms and practices. All mainstream Islamic parties swear by these constitutions –– though insurgents and fringe Islamic groups105 have expressed reservations. Economic policy has been fully committed to liberal restructuring since at least 1988 and regime change has not diluted this commitment. The size of the government has shrunk significantly during these two decades. The total public expenditure to GDP ratio declined from an average of 24.1 percent during the 1990s to 18.7 percent in the 2000s (PER 2011 Statistical Appendix Tables p2-3) IMF programmes have often been in place and though the government has frequently failed to meet programme obligations, the liberal orientation of policy has not changed due to IMF programme non completion. Moreover the Pakistani state bureaucracy has been deeply penetrated by the United States. Military, civilian and political leadership often share US policy perspectives despite frequent public expressions of dissent due to the popular and growing mass hostility against America.106 About 35 members of the federal parliament elected in 2002 had US nationality. Almost “all aspects of internal law and order counter terrorism, anti money laundering and nuclear non proliferation are influenced by Washington. Most (federal) ministries including interior, defence, finance, commerce and foreign affairs have bilateral arrangements with the US . . . . The Pakistani state is hard put to make a case form sovereignty so deeply penetrated (is) its ally in its affairs. Pakistan’s governance issues are no longer internal” (Shafqat 2011 p102). Moreover, since 2006 USAID has become hyperactive in Pakistan recruiting thousands of clients and functionaries for its aid financed projects. Provincial bureaucracies in Khybar Pakhtunkhawa and Baluchistan are specially targeted and government officials incharge of these aid funded projects with increased salaries and perks are natural local clients of the United States.

Pakistan has however not emerged as an effective node of regional security governance despite its support as combatant in the US war of terror. It has provided logistic support and co-operated under protest in the continuing drone attacks in the Northern Areas which have intensified since Obama took office (Ashraf 2010). Its resentment of US violation of its air space for the Osama bin Laden assassination in May 2011 has been luke warm. Nevertheless with NATO troop withdrawal from Afghanistan Pakistan’s significance as a regional centre for US strategic initiatives will decrease.107 Pakistan’s participation in global economic flows is trivial. In 2010-11 Pakistan’s per capita income was $1254 and GNP amounted to about $220 billion108–– less than 0.3 percent of world national income. It has since 2008 been the slowest growing South Asian economy with an annual average growth rate of 2.9 percent during 2008-2011 (implying near stagnant per capita income). In 2010-11 total exports amounted to $17.8 billion and imports to $29.0 billion –– these are minuscule shares of world trade volumes. The external trade (exports and imports) to GDP ratio equaled 23.3 percent in 2011. This ratio stood at 36 percent in 2007-08 and has declined every year during 2007-2011. Workers remittance have been rising since 2003 and in 2010-11 amounted to about $10 billion (equivalent to about 5 percent of GDP). In 2010-11109 the capital and financial account surplus amounted to just $1.6 billion (as against $3.1 billion in 2009-10). As against this deficit on the service account equaled $1.2 billion and deficit on the income account equaled $2.1 billion in 2010-11 significantly exceeding the capital and financial account surplus. Total aid and public loan inflow amounted to $1.5 billion but amortization of the debt equaled $1.2 billion thus the net loan inflow was trivial –– $267 million (less than 0.1 percent of GDP and about 0.7 percent of total investment in 2010-11). Net foreign investment (direct and portfolio) amounted to about $1.3 billion in 2010-11 –– equaling about 3.8 percent of total investment –– FDI has been falling every year since 2007-08 when it had peaked at over $6.1 billion110. Pakistan’s economy is thus of little concern to global markets.111 Trade and capital flow volumes are trivial as are outstanding debt levels –– Pakistan’s total public external debt and liabilities amounted to $59.5 billion in 2011 about 90 percent of which is public debt (PES2011 p120) Pakistan is not a highly indebted country according to the World Bank’s classification and debt sustainability remain satisfactory (PES2011 Table 9.5 p124). Thus a rupture of political ties with the West will not destabilize the Pakistani economy which is overwhelmingly domestic demand driven and not dependent on external trade, services or financial flows. Some sectors –– most notably the military –– may have to significantly reposition themselves –– because of their technological and training links with the United States but they are unlikely to be “left in the lurch” by China, Iran, Saudi Arabia etc for all of whom Pakistan is a key regional defense ally.112

The impetus for democratization and social liberalization if any can be sustained not principally by foreign social and political interventions but by local and indigenous forces. Formally the constitutional framework remains liberal (with a mild Islamic reinterpretation which does not challenge liberal rights). Similarly acceptance of a liberal economic policy framework has characterized all Pakistani regimes except that of Z.A Bhutto (1972-77). However the gulf between practice and rhetoric remains wide in both the political and the economic sphere.113Pakistan has been described as a “predatory” state (Soblan 2002 p19-20) and arbitrary bureaucratic intervention and obstruction through cumbersome regulatory processes remains endemic.114 Similarly Pakistan’s political history is full of instances where constitutional obligations have been ignored and the constitutional order deliberately subverted by politicians to facilitate military intervention (Niaz 2010 p 89-138). Moreover there is not much enthusiasm for democratic practice by the emergent indigenous middle classes which have collaborated with both the Ayub and the Musharaf regimes (Zaidi 2007). Democratic institutions have had their authority limited by the dominance of the armed forces over both foreign affairs and defence expenditure.115 An “Arab Spring” is unlikely in Pakistan because popular repression of the Gaddafi, Asad, Mubarak type has never been practiced or institutionalised in Pakistan. There have been upsurges of mass support for democratization from time to time –– 1968-69, 1977, and the lawyers movement of 2007-2009116 which have led to regime transition in all cases117 but the new incumbents in power have not altered governance practices so that popular participation in governance and accountability of rulers have not increased. The structure of the state and the culture of governance has not been transformed by the transition from military to civilian regimes. Governance continues to be articulated through, authoritarian, arbitrary practices contextualized by a formal acknowledgment of liberal norms and procedures and the institutionalized avoidance of popular repression. Regime change has usually been a negotiated process.118 Transition from military regimes in 1969, 1972, 1988 and 2008 have involved four major groups, the military, the politicians the senior bureaucratic and above all foreign powers particularly the United States and Saudi Arabia. The purpose of the transitional negotiation has always been to prevent a “rocking of the boat” i.e. to ensure that Pakistan’s state structure, governance practices and specially foreign policy remains unchanged. Policy continuity has thus marked regime transition in 1958, 1969, 1977 and 2008.119 In 2011 the US recommended a series of measures to ensure that the 2008 transition was long lasting120. But the US does not appear to have the capability to ensure the implementation of these measures and in any case if the forthcoming (2013) elections brings to office a less, compliant civilian regime US preferences may change as they have often in the past.

According to the World Bank the Pakistani state’s effectiveness has been in continuous decline since 1990 and in 2010 the American journal Foreign Policy placed Pakistan as number ten in its “failed state” list (citied in Shah 2011 p69-70). On the other hand several voices have been raised clamming that Pakistani society is resilient and strong (Lodhi 2011, Levien 2011, Rediell 2011).121 The often expressed view that Pakistan has a strong society and a weak state (Lodhi 2011, Leiven 2011) fails to recognize the processes by which state and societal processes have been synchronized. Modernizing elites –– such as Bhutto, Ayub, Musharaf –– have had to modify their political agendas to take account of social structures and values. This is the primary reason where regime change –– transition from military to democratic rules – does not lead to change in the system of governance. Both military and democratic regimes have used state resources to distribute patronage to kinship linked clients. The state is a “negotiated” terrain in the it provides space for bargaining and compromise between competing kinship-patronage networks.122 Social liberalization is in its essence an individuation process and a society dominated by kinship-patronage structures offers little incentive for articulating liberal policies. State institutions have been incapacitated due to their colonial origins. These have only partially been remolded to facilitate kinship-patronage structure dominance. Thus the very wide powers of unelected administrators have been retained – and democratic governments have in 1972 and 2008 abandoned local government reforms of military regimes --- but are subject to tremendous pressure to facilitate kinship patronage activities of politician. The police force has also been transferred into an instrument for the exercise of power by local kinship networks. Parliamentary and party mechanisms are manipulated to serve kinship-patronage network. The very pronounced tendency to split political parties –– posing a perpetual threat to parliamentary majorities –– reflects squabbles over resources for patronage distribution and has no ideological basis.123 Client patronage networks have also subsumed this judicial system, which is fractured into three sub-sectors: state law, the jirga panchiyat system and shariat courts. The state judicial system is effectively paralyzed –– settlements take years –– and is heavily biased against the underprivileged. Access to this system is heavily obstructed by language barriers –– it uses English which is not understood by an overwhelming majority of Paksitani who view the local judicial process as exploitative unfair and ineffective. Since the late 1990, the legislative and judicial arms of government have often clashed and governments have often refused to abide by and implement the decisions of the judiciary. As against this there is widespread respect for the consensual decision making process of the jirga / panchayat system. The state itself makes use of the jirga system and it is therefore possible to move between the state and communal jirga institutional networks. Communal law seeks compromise between kinship group (not retribution).124 The existence of the jirga system undermines the liberal constitutional basis of the Pakistani state, as does the existence of Shariah courts. These are at present mainly confined to the FATA area but Lieven notes widespread support for the implementation of Shariah law throughout Pakistan (2011 p421). Support for the Taliban derives mainly from an appreciation of the legal reforms they have introduced in Afghanistan and FATA.125

The military has also been at least partly been within kinship – patronage networks despite the fact that it is the Pakistan’s most modern state institutions with a well defined and fully operational authoritative structure. Senior general effectively control regime transition, all military presidents have relinquished power when the senior generals decided so. Moreover the military resists political interference in appointments and promotions (Leiven 2011. P162). All military take overs have enjoyed popular support. The military has established a large economic presence and its patronage –kinship linkage network serves as a mechanism for extracting state resources and distributing these among its participants. Its ties with the landlord elite are particularly strong (Lieven 2011 p 167-174, Siddiqua 2007 passim). The military’s attitude to the constitutional order is best illustrated by its 2009 Swat campaign against the Taliban. All operations were conducted outside the constitution and the existing administrative and political infrastructure was by passed. Generous public financing was commandered. The media was firmly controlled and “embedded” within the military operation (Lieven 2011 p444-461). Public response and criticism of the offensive was determinedly ignored. Popular support for the army has been eroded by its failure to win any of the three wars with India (1949, 1965, 1971) its continued participation (though with reservations) in America’s war of terror and its involvement in state corruption networks during its extended periods of government. Despite the relatively liberal styles of rulers such as Musharraf and Ayub Khan and their sporadic social liberalisation initiatives (the abolition of state control of the media by Musharaf, the enactment of anti Shariat Muslims family law ordinance by Ayub) the military has never been expected to play a politically liberalizing role in Pakistan. In the concluding section we will attempt to construct “a balance sheet” of the prospects of liberalizing Pakistan on the basis of the eclectic review of evidence undertaken here on characteristic of Pakistani individuality society and state. IV. Prospects Table 2 presents a summary assessment of identitarean societal and state characteristics of Pakistan. Table 2 Individual, Societal and State Characteristics of Pakistan 2012 Liberalism Requirements(i) Pakistani Characteristics Identity Value transition from secular to religious. Attitude to politics Individuation Preference for post materialist values Mind set Cosmopolitan identification Incomplete values change religious legitimization as required for secular transactions. Strongly influenced by traditional Islam.ii Non participative. Passive expectation of benefits from political process. Strong sense of powerlessness and tendency to subscribe to conspiracy theory explanations of failures. Weak. Honor seen to derive from contribution to promoting resources of kinship groups, community based moral codes predominate.

Extremely limited. Confined to a very small section of a very small cosmopolitan elite. Emotional Strong need for dependence on ‘savior figures. Subscribes to conspiracy theories. Individual autonomy net valued.iii Confined to technocratic bureaucratic elites managing aid financed projects and an English speaking intelligentsia dominating policy discourse but not policy implementation and women leaders.iv Societal characteristics Social dominance of scientific method. Social dominance of a technologically skilled middle class Social dominance of the bourgeoisie Participation in global markets Ethnic diversity Social salience of associations Relative social inequality Scientific methodologies routinely used in policy discourse to justify policies formulated. But polices are implemented to serve kinship-patronage interest networks. Technologically skilled middle class strongly influences policy rationalization / justification but not policy formulation and implementations. Middle class quite small according to most estimates. Role of the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie in policy formulation , implementation quite limited. Upper echelon of the bourgeoisie linked to landed interests and the salariat through kinship-patronage network. A strong thriving ‘bazzar’ bourgeoisie operates outside the formal economy (pays few taxes, routinely circumvents state policy). Small and declining in terms of both trade and capital flows. Remittances from immigrants increasing. Pronounced and a strong identity marker Sectarian diversity more apparent than real. Ethnic nationalism weak and seeks compromises within the existing socio-political system.v Society dominated by kinship-patronage linkage networks which incorporate both urban and rural communities, rich and poor, emergent and traditional elites. The stability and ‘strength, of Pakistan societies derives from this all pervasive, all encompassing predominance of kinship-patronage networks. Moders associational groups –– professional associations and trade union are weak and their influences is declining NGO net works specially those associated with the women’s movement increasingly socially influential but mainly instruments for distribution of patronage financer net value transformative potential at the mass level is quite limited.vi Not high by South Asian or developing country standards but rising during the last two decades. Social performance indicators very poor. State Characteristics Liberal nationalism Co-operation between labour and capital Growth of democratic institutions and civil liberties. Division within authoritarian regimes. Integrations within cosmopolitan democracy Performance legitimacy Transition process Recomposition of the state Provision of aid Impact of globalization of non liberal elites Muslim nationalism is a variant of liberal nationalism. Initially masses strongly committed to Muslim nationalism but initial idealism weakened due to the subsumption of politics by the kinship-patronage networks. Labour’s bargaining power extremely weak. No operational institutionalization of collective bargaining.vii

All constitutions have guaranteed civil liberties. HR violations are usually not sponsored by the state but are acts of ‘free lancer’ brutality or of command consensual decisions.viii All state institutions –– administrative, judicial, legislative –– have been effectively subsumed by kinship-patronage network. This is less true of the military which is Pakistan’s most modern state institution but it also serves as a dispenser of patronage resources extracted from the state to its clients. The military is linked to societal kinship-patronage networks and dependent on the global system hegemon (America). Operates mainly outside the constitutional framework. Military regimes dominated by senior generals. Transition strongly influenced by foreign powers specially America and Saudi Arabia. Continuity in both governance process and policy of authoritarian and democratic regimes pronounced. Transition from authoritarian TO democratic regimes occasional by endemic splits within ruling coalitions. Weak Pakistan a very small global player in terms of trade, capital and technology flows India much more important both economically and strategically. American dependence on Pakistani military likely to decline significantly after withdrawal from Afghanistan. Economic performance an important determinant of regime legitimacy since political participation is seen as primarily a means for extracting resources from the state for kinship-patronage network. Entails “transplacement” rather than “transformation” or “replacement” State sovereignty weakened due to participations in America’s war of terror and acceptance of IMF, World Bank and ADB role in formulation (not implementation) of economic policy. Concessional development aid flows modest Military aid –– especially in the form of technical and training support, significant Weak, illustrated in the states limited success in constraining sectarian violence and ethno national and Islamic insurgences.ix Notes: (i)These are taken from Table 1 (ii) This is less true of the upper echelons of the technocratic bureaucratic elite and English centric intelligences. It is also less true of most participants in the women’s movement. (iii) Except by groups identified in footnote above (ii) (iv) However only a small segment within the Women’s Movement are willing to reject family and religious traditions. (v) The exception here is the Baloch nationalist insurgency which in our opinion is unlikely to succeed. Sectarian organizations and Islamic insurgents seek to capture the Pakistani state not to destroy it. they have an ambivalent attitude to the ideology of Muslim nationalism. (vi) Even the Women’s Movement does touch the day to day lives of the female population. (vii) Although social democratic parties have often ruled Pakistan and extensive labour rights have been legislatively recognized. (viii) There is no popular demand for implementation of the liberal rights guaranteed by the constitutions. All military coups have had popular support. All mass movements (1953, 1968-69, 1977) have focused on religious or economic resentment. The lawyers movement of 2007-09 did not agitate for liberal rights but for recognition of the autonomy and prestige of the judiciary.

(ix) An English centric small technocratic and intellectual elite demonates policy discourse and also heavily influences programme formulation by donor agencies. This elite espouses liberal values but its ability to implement the policies it advocates is limited due to its subsumption within the traditional kinship-patronage networks through which it extracts state and donor resources for its own private consumption. Source Table 1 and Section III reviewed texts In the light of the literature review summarized in Table 2 it is clear that prospects for liberalization of Pakistan are not particularly bright. Individuation is weak and citizens remain committed to promoting kinship interest. A very large segment of the population is outside the formal economy and state merketization initiatives does not touch their lives. Buzzer rationality is subject to the community based customary moral economy. The sense of justice is derived from kinship network obligations not from conceptions of individual (human) rights. The game of ‘cataplexy’ which characterizes the Pakistani non formal economy sanctions not assignments of benefits in accordance to superior skill and chance (as the liberal market does) but in accordance to kinship patronage network services. The state is an arena for negotiating kinship-patronage network compromises. It is not legitimized by the protection of individual rights and it is regarded as morally obligatory to appropriate state resources for benefitting specific kinship patronage networks that happen to be in power. Nozick’s liberal “meta utopas” and Gray’s “post traditional society” which (in theory) permit a concatenation of individual ideal life plans cannot be a desired political framework when the citizen is subsumed within kinship networks and therefore ascribes little value to individual autonomy. There is little incentive for reinterpreting historically sanctioned traditions for justifying liberal rights and practices. Muslim nationalism represented such a reinterpretation which endorsed liberal values and practices but it has been significantly weakened by the consolidation of kinship patronage networks throughout society. The growth of liberal individuality has been constrained by its subsumption within kinship patronage networks and by the almost non existence of class consciousness in Pakistan. Acceptance of liberal rights and state operational procedures have remained mainly formal rather the substantive. Liberalist expectations have also been weakened by the gradual do sovereigniz4ation of the state through the subordination of national economic policy to global agencies and through participation in the American led war of terror since 2001. Pakistan’s very marginal position in the global economic and political order prevents its incorporation within cosmopolitan democracy. This is also restructured by the existence of a weak and relatively small middle class with strong links within traditional kinship patronage network “Subject” – rather than participatory citizenship - and flourishes in these circumstances.

Regime changes have been frequent in Pakistan bal they have involved changes in the governance system. Democracy and authoritarian regimes have remained committed to liberal rights and constitutional forms but their embedeness in kinship patronage networks has prevented them from implementing liberal structural changes. The regime transition process has involved “transplacement” and has been negotiated by foreign powers. Agents which may be expected to play a social liberalizing role are few. The technocratic bureaucratic and English centric intelligensia retain client patronage linkages for exploitation of state and donor resources. New social movementsare almost nonexistent and the Women’s movement although a force for liberalization does not have a significant impact on the lives of women involved in it. Post modernist “decentring” of identities does not flourish in Pakistan although globalization has contributed to a partial “hollowing out” of the state. As argued above prospects for liberalization are not bright Liberalism’s contender ideologies –– ethno nationalism and Islamic radicalism –– have firmer social roots Co-opting ethno-national tendencies within a “post panoptican” post liberal global order requires, the articulation of cultural politics which can undermine the values legitimating kinship and the family. The role of the media is crucially important in this respect Musharaf’s media ‘emancipation’ has allowed the electronic media to flood most Pakistani homes with images of sexual behavior which are incompatible with family centric moral norms. Rebelling against these norms has the potential to become a mass phenomenon and sexual rebellion (specially by young women) can escalate into a wider more comprehensive rejection of kinship focused identitarian and authoritarian structures.126 Promoting sexual rebellion should therefore be a major strategic initiative of those who seek to modernize Pakistan. This should be a particularly preferred strategy for liberals since sexual liberation necessarily ‘westernizes’ Pakistan individuality and society and thus paves the way for legitimating liberal governance processes. Notes Locke insists that the authority to “care for the salvation of souls cannot be vested in the magistrate by the consent of the people” (1957 p42-46). This is particularly significant in the case of Pakistan for it seems to rule out the possibility of a non secular liberal state Locke, it must be remembered was one of the leading polemicists against the Puritans. Which the Greek word (‘katalattein’) from which ‘catalectic’ is derived from, implies. Including libertarians such as Robort Nozick who distinguishes anarchism form liberalism on the basis that while anarchism seeks to abolish the state, liberalism seeks to preserve what Nozick calls “a minimalist” state (Nazick 1974 chp1). Popper gives the example of a pianist’s right to practice as against his neighbors’ right to rest (1992p157). See for examples Rawls (1995). Gray claims that “by the mid nineteenth century individualist patterns of economic and social life had spread over most of Europe, including Russia and there nowhere remained a traditional social order of unbroken communal ties” (1986 p 87).

Best described as Social Democrats. Adam Smith himself wrote at great length about measures that ought to be taken to restrict and counter monopolistic market trends. See Phillipson (1983). Although transition to liberal political order is of course not guaranteed through institutionalization of co-operate between management and labour. As reflected in IMF and WTO practices and in the operational procedures of private standard setting and rating agencies. Hence Barrington Move’s famous (1969) dictum “no bourgeois no democracy.” But authors such as Reily (2001) argue that ethnic diversity can lead to breakdown of liberal order unless appropriate constitutional “balancing” is skillfully managed. The search for preconditions for democratization has proved inconclusive and according to Case “most theorists have abandoned it” (2010 p97). Characterized by regular elections, reduced civil liberties, partisan use of media resources, distorted forms of communication etc. See also Diamond (et al 1990) on this point. As is the case in the United States where according to Fukuyama” (i)n 1974 the top one percent of householders took home nine percent of GDP (and) by 2007 that share had increased to 23.5 percent” (2012 p58). Modernization literature is rooted in the works of Durtheim and Parsons and contrasts “traditional” and “modern” societies in terms of status, roles, values and orientation. Other classic contributions include Lipset (1959) Deutsch (1961) Almond and Coleman (1966 and Huntington (1965). As noted above the end of transitiology has been announced by a leading political scientist. In contract traditional Modernization literature sees modernization as essentially a social process. A “participant” is aware of political systemic processes, approves of it, provides required inputs enthusiastically and expects benefits from political outputs (Almond and Verby 1963 p76-81). The independent influence of political culture on the liberalization (“transition”) process has been widely questioned (Inglehart 1997, Diamond 1993) on the grounds that it is difficult to separate political culture from other social structural characteristics. Whether ethnic fractionalization becomes a hindrance to the promotion of liberal order depends on factors such as the behavior of political elites and the extent to which the political system provides space for the articulation of ethnic interests (Chandra 2004). Austerity policies have had to be imposed in severely indebted states such as Greece, Ireland and Portugal against popular will see Blackburn (2011) The classic work here is that of Olsen (1965) And as the Euro crisis has shown even countries such as Italy and France are deeply affected by international financial upheavals. Legitimized by the famous R2P resolution of the UN General Assembly in 2005. The British used a system of indirect rule in the Indian subcontinent involving the co-option of lower power structures with local elites acting as buffers between the rulers and the masses Imperial economic policy in British India was market centric

East European states are primary examples of this. “The cultural, global and complexity turns are not coherent and consistent intellectual paradigms but rather a short hand way of describing a changing emphasis vis a vis Modernist sociology” Taylor (2010 p3). Including the conception of “post panoptical” power defined by its ability to escape confirmation leading to a “decentring” of both state and social authoritative structures. That is not concerned with the seizure of state power. The New Political sociology literature is vast. It has its origins in the critiques of Marx, Gramsci, Weber, Dahl Wright Mills and Alamond and Verba etc. major exponents of he cultural turn include Lyotard (1984) Baudrillard (1983) and Sarup (1993). The ‘global turn’ literature is exemplified by the work of Hirst and Thompson (1999) Held (1993) Castillo (2000) Giddens (1990) and also Habermas (2001). The ‘complexity turn’ literature is represented Urry (2005, 2006 and Capron (1996). The New Political Society literature focuses overwhelmingly on advanced Western societies and states. Young (1989) has argued that liberalism articulated a model of citizenship which denies the existence of social and economic differences. All citizens unanimously endorse liberal values which denied their particularity when exercising the rights and duties of citizenship. Liberal democratic institutions ignore differences in identities. Liberal laws ware applicable irrespective of the social inequality which characterizes civil society. Defined by Keane as “a conglomeration of interlocking and over lapping sub-state, state and super state institutions and multi dimensional processes that interact and have political and social effects on a global scale” (Keane 2003 p95). That is a “factor’s” contribution to aggregate output. As ‘public choice’ theorists would put it. Sen. (2009) speculates how this can be achieved (Sp p87-113). For a classic statement see Buchanan and Tullock (1962). Liberal statesmen seek to convince citizens that market justice is ‘true justice’. Non markets notions of justice are articulated by Social Democrats. The ‘ historic compromise’ of capitalism’s golden era (1950-71) involved a reconciliation of liberal and social democratic principles. The organized working classes accepted capitalist markets determined property rights in exchange for social security and rising real wages throughout the West. Subsequent PPP governments (1988-90, 1994-96 and 2008…………) have not addressed this issue seriously but managing the operations of the economy and the democratic process adroitly is essential for the consolidation of liberal order. However if liberalism is weakly socially embedded, market and rights pressures will remain weak and reconciliation of the contradictory demands of markets and democratic practices may not be of major salience. 39. Zia ul Huq’s regime (1977-88) is an exception as the suspension of democratic order in that period was not accompanied by major expansion of the sphere of the market Zia retained most of Z.A. Bhutto’s economic policies (credit planning, financial sector nationalisation state ownership of capital goods producing industries).

40. That is distribution of resources on the basis of contribution to aggregate output on one hand and to collectively determined social choices on the other. 41. That is policy choices determined by the application of (social) scientific methodologies. 42. Which includes also non technologically skilled owners of capital. 43. Anatol Leiven lays great stress on the slaiance of kinship as a determinant of identity consciousness in urban Pakistan (2011, p14-15, p137-138). The Taliban movements in both Pakistan and Afghanistan have also (partially successfully) sought to do this in Khyber Pakhtunkhawa (Lieven 2011 see specially chp 11). Deobandi orthodoxy selectively repudiates certain caste and tribal practices on this basis but Barelvi orthodoxy seeks to continue the Chishtya / Qadriya mission of subsuming local identities within Islamic value systems. See Baig (2000). The most important illustration of this is provided by Pakistan’s constitutional history. All constitutions (1956, 1962, 1973 and twenty subsequent amendments) include symbolic Islamic references but none adopt decision making and implementation procedures derived from Islamic political history or the Shariah (see Gaboreau 2002). Salman Taseer, then governor of the Punjab was murdered by a Barelvi devotee Mumtaz Qadri. Mr. Taseer had campaigned for the abolition of Pakistan’s blasphemy laws. It is significant that Altaf Hussain the leader of the most successful mass secular party in Pakistan –– the Muthaida Qaumi Movement –– is known as ‘pir sahib’ among his followers. This is true of secular parties such as the People’s Party (Bhutto – Benazir –Zardari-Bilawal and the Awami National Party (Ghaffar-Wali-Asfandyar). According to Qadeer “(even) Pakistani women of modern inclination (are) not secular or indifferent to religion. Her faith been awakened by the international events that target Islam. She finds comfort in her identity as a Muslim” (2009 p91) Three such challenges may be mentioned, the People’s Party’s aggressive espousal of socialist values during 1967-1973, GM Syed’s repudiation of Sindh’s Islamic identity and the Muthaida Qaumi Movement’s challenge to Islamic forces in Karachi. GM Syed’s movement has remained weak and isolated and both the PPP and MQM have very significantly diluted their Islamic critique. An alliance of the six major mainstream Islami parties formed to fight the 2002 election. Thus there was no transfer of power from the civil bureaucracy to the ulema network, no suspension of ADB and World Bank financed programmes, no repudiation of interest payments and no restrictions on army operations against insurgents. Bhutto declared Ahmadis as non Muslims in 1974 and banned alcohol and gambling in 1977. Zia amended the constitution and introduced Islamic legislation in 1979 and 1985 and Nawaz Sharif introduced the Shariat Bill in the national assembly in 1998. They launched such movements in 1953 against the Ahmadis against Ayub Khan in 1968-69, against Bhutto in 1977, the latter two as part of democratic coalitions.

A coalition of Islamic parties formed in Lahore in late 2009 after the disintegration of the MMA. Shia Ulema were part of the group which formulated the Ulema’s demand that became the foundation of the famous Basic Principle Resolution passed by the Constituent Assembly in 1949. Such as the Tahrik Tahafuz-i-Namus Risalat (2010-2011) and the Khatm-i-Nubiyat tahrik. During the 1980s Zia ul Huq in reaction to Shia mobilization against the compulsory state collection of Zakat, included some Deobandi ulema within state institutions. (specially the Islamic Advisory Council) and Musharaf and American aid dispensers have focused on mobilizing. Barelvi groups for popular agitation against the Taliban (Abu Zahab 2002, Lieven 2011 p398, 471). Several scholars have assessed Muslim nationalism as an awkward concatenation of two divergent trends pan Islamic consciousness on the one hand and economic resentment against Hindu and Shikh domination (especially in East Bengal, Sindh and Punjab) on the other see Ayers (2009) Cohen (2004) Jalal (1985) in Sindh. Commitment to Muslim nationalism has declined due to the strength of kinship identification and patronage networks (Leiven 2011 p61). This is true not just of Karachi where the Muthaida Qaumi Movement nurtures the disillusionment of former supporters of Muslim nationalist parties but also of Sindh nationalist movement whose founder Sain G.M. Syed moved the resolution for including Sindh in Pakistan in the provincial assembly in 1942. (Ahmad 2002 Chp1) The Mutahida Qaumi Movement also stokes the fire of hatred against the Pathan settlers in Karachi and the Awami National Party nurtures Pathan consciousness among these settlers. Partly also nurtured in the case of the Mohajir by a sense of ethno linguistic superiority. The Sindhi nationalist demand seems to be movement towards a confenderal constitution and the MQM officially seeks to transform itself into a pro federal national party (Hussain 2009). According to Feroz Ahmad there has been the development of a common language a leveling of social values and norms of behavior across ethnic boundaries in Pakistan (2002 p42). Baloch ethno-nationalism may be an exception but this may be interpreted as one of its inherent weaknesses which makes its political triumph improbable. Thus while the Zia regime (1977-1988) played a part in the emergence of the MQM and the politicization of the Urdu speaking community in Karachi the Musharaf government (1999-2008) and the subsequent PPP administration has sought to incorporate the MQM in both authoritarian and democratic federal provincial and local governance process. See Hashmi (2010) for a detailed analysis. These nationalist groups and parties have been equally ready to support both authoritarian and democratic governments –– the ANP is a coalition partner of the present PPP but its predecessor party, the NAP supported the Ayub regime after the China turn in 1966, Sindhi nationalists supported the Zia (1977-1988) regime (discussed below).

With the sole exception of the Jama’at-i-Islami a Muslim nationalist, quasi fundamentalist party. Lawyers led a successful movement against Musharaf’s authoritarian regime during 2007-2010. All mainstream Islamic parties swear by Pakistan’s “Islamic constitution (which fully incorporates all liberal rights) and participate in democratic processes. However like the sectarian and ethno-nationalist parties they remain equally willing to support authoritarian regimes –– the, MMA split up in 2008 because of the Jami’at-i-Ulema Islam’s unwavering support for Musharaf. I believe that by recognizing differences in lifestyles Qadeer is necessarily recognizing the existence of “clauses in themselves” (though not classes for themselves) in Pakistan. These estimates reported in Durr-e-Nayyab (2011) employ a range of definitions. The lowest estimates of the upper and middle class classify the former as those having an income of more than $50 per person per day, and the latter as those having an income of between $12-$50 per person per day (in 2007-08 prices). The highest estimates the ‘upper class’ as those with an income in excess of 125 percent of the national medium income and the middle class as consisting of those with an income in the range of 75 percent to 125 percent of the national median income. This “expanded middle class” concept was operationalised by estimating a composite index of five weighted sub indices –– education, occupation, income, lifestyles and housing. Moreover to qualify for inclusion in Durre Nayyab’s estimates of the middle class the threshold income level is only Rs 72.3 (equivalent to $1.2 at 2007-08 exchange rate and prices per person per month. This corresponds roughly with Ravilion’s (2010) definition of the middle class. Sectarianism it has been argued above is a modernising ideology representing a significant departure from Islamic traditions. That is since the overthrow of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Akbar Zaidi (2009 Chp23) has argued persuasively that during the Musharaf era emergent elite classes have been willing to collaborate with the military regime because of a lack of popular enthusiasm for democratization. Orthodox and revisionist Islamic parties –– e.g. the Jama’at –i-Islami and the Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam –– have also been using this strategy since 1947. However they remain committed to traditional Islamic values and are strongly opposed to the Islamic modernism of Ghulam Ahmad Parvez and Javed Ghamdi (Husain 2006). Emphasis Pasha’s. Society remains predominantly traditional with the extended family as its fundamental fulcrum and the state remains strongly subject to authoritarian forces (specially the military) despite its constitutional democratic structure and form. The economy on the other hand has become increasingly privatized during the last two decades. However the continued predominance of family businesses seriously limits economic modernization. Understord as the relative disjuncture of the norms prevalent in market behavior from the norms underlying social relations and also political practices.

Statistics in this para are from PES (2011) Statistical Appendix Table 1.1, 1.2, 12.9 and 12.11. As Sayeed (2002) argues the share of The capital goods sub sector within large scale manufacturing remains very low in Pakistan (p206-207). Tariq Rehman’s term (2002 p97). Niaz calls the military elite “praetorians”, the civil bureaucracy “mandarins” and professionals are classified as being “guardians” and “diwans” (2002 Chp2 to 7). Although both civil and the military bureaucracy ire seem as originally (i.e. between 1947 to 1953 when Khawaja Nazimudin’s government was overthrown) committed to the British prioritization of the preservation of law and order and administrative political neutrality. They were drawn into illiberal politics by the politicians (See Niaz 2010 Chp3 and 4). 61 percent of army officers as against 64 percent of higher civil bureaucratic come from urban backgrounds (Ahmad 2009). Under Ayub Khan (up till 1969) the dominant ideological orientation was nationalist secular, under Zia an attempt was made to promote Islamic values and practices although the command structure of the armed forces remained unaltered. Under Musharaf Islamic fundamentalism was delegitimized and nationalist secularism promoted. Since Ayub Khan’s era developmentalism has also become a core value and the relatively high rates of growth achieved during military regimes are regarded as important achievements by the officer cadre (Nawaz 2008). Secular nationalist ideology suffered a major setback due to the military defeat in the 1971 war with India and its partial abandonment by Zia was a means for relegitemising the social and political status of the army. After all General Musharaf, Pakistan’s most important military modernizer overthrew a constitutional democratic regime in 1999. Pirs are leaders of religious communities. The present prime minister of Pakistan, Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani is a pir. The only exception is the Muthaida Quami Movement (MQM) a Karachi based party. I served as Economic Advisor to the Federation of Pakistan Chamber of Commerce and Industry (FPCCI) during 2009-2011 and can confirm that FPCCI played almost no role whatever in the formulation of Pakistan’s Industrial Policy 2010 document. This is less true of the financial, as against the large and small scale manufacturing sector. The trading community has strong Islamic orientation and is a major source of finance for the madrassas. The FPCCI and its local chambers have remained the strongest critics of IMF stabilization programmes but have been unable to influence macro policy because of individual business leaders prioritization of their search for government concessions. Figures in this paragraph are from Government of Pakistan, PES 2010-2011 p155 – 165 and p111-116. A recent case is the failed action against the dismissal of several thousand workers by the recently privatized Karachi Electric Supply Corporation during 2011. The action was undertaken by a People’s Party trade union. It lasted for over nine months but was completely unsuccessful. See Siddiqui (2012).

These include women, child and minority rights groups mainly. Although the John Hopkins sample does include a small number of obviously Islamic NGOs in the “education” category. However these may be “modernizing” Islamic NGOs, presenting a relatively “enlightened moderate” view of Islam. Usually with strong kinship-patronage linkages with the political elite ensuring access to both government and donor funding. Including e.g. the Jama’at- i-Islami which has formed an affiliated Working Women’s Association focusing on promotion and protection of the rights of women employees. Female participation rate is highest among older women (those aged above 35). In this age group female labour participations rate averaged 28 percent in 2009-10 against only about 21 percent in the 15.24 age group (PES 2011 Appendix Table 12.13). Initiatively one would expect the former age group to be less influenced by the women’s movement than the latter. “Women (in Pakistan) do not view everyday experiences of religion as either oppressive . . . or constraints. (This is true) whether the (women) live in rural or urban areas (or were) rich or poor” (Shaheed 2002 p365). A recent survey by the Islamic Research Academy Karachi (IRA) found that in a representative sample in Karachi neighborhoods in 2009 women were twice as likely to perform the five obligatory prayers then men (unpublished). See the essays by Bari and Khattak, Shaheed, Sumar and N.S Khan is the Mumtaz et al (2002) Nadir and Naseem (2002) and Weiss and Gilani (2002) anthologies. Such as Tahreek-i-Taliban –i- Pakistan (most vociferously) the Ahrar (since 1953), the Tahreek-i-Nifaz-i-Shariat-i-Muhammadi, Jama’at al dawa etc (in muted terms and occasionally). However strong reservations have been expressed by segments of the military leadership about American policy vis-avis the Afghan Taliban (Leiven 2011 p 413-416) It is inconceivable that Pakistan can play a supportive role in US military initiatives against Iran similar to its support of American forces in the attack on Afghanistan. According to World Bank estimates Pakistan’s gross national income in 2009 equaled $168 6 billion (2011 p10-13) Figures are for July 2010 to April, 2011. Statistics in this paragraph are taken from PER (2011) Statistical Appendix p 71-85. Pakistan ranks 171 out of 199 countries in terms of income per capita World Bank (2011 p10-13) The banking sector may also be influenced negatively by such a rupture because during Ishrat Husain’s governorship of the State Bank of Pakistan (1999-2005) several major banks (Muslim Commercial Bank, United Bank, Habib Bank) were capitalized by foreign investors who assumed management control. At least three foreign banks (Citibank, HSBC and Standard Chartered) have become major players in the Pakistani financial markets. Despite the fact that they are overwhelmingly domestically sourced a rupture with the West can lead to asset restructuring (Meenai and Ansari 2010). Governments implementing a nationalist programme involving a rupture with the US will probably implement a bank nationalization policy (as Bhutto did in 1974) and impose strict controlS on current and capital account transactionS (as Nawaz Sharif did following the nuclear blast in 1998).

Regarding the economic sphere Salman and Arbi (2009) estimate relatively low scores for economic freedom in all Pakistani provinces based on the Canadian Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom Index. Thus Janjua et al (2011) find that inability to meet project procedural requirements has led to a massive build up of “carry over” funds which far exceed annual allocations in the overwhelming majority of projects financed by the Sindh Annual Development Programme during 2010-11. The military budget is not subject to parliamentary approval. The social libertisations potential of the 2007-2009 lawyers movement was somewhat limited. It’s main concern was Musharaf’s overthrow and recognition of the judiciary’s independence and prestige. It presented no programme for reform of the paralyzed and cumbersome judicial system which makes access to legally sanctioned rights impossible for the masses. However in two cases the transition led to the emergence of a military regime ––– Yayha Khan in 1969 and Zia ul Huq in 1977. Perhaps with the exception of Ayub Khan’s coup d’etat in 1958 (See Aziz 2009). But Aziz hints at US support for the Ayub takeover. The exception to this was the transition iN 1972 when Bhutto significantly changed Pakistan’s foreign and economic policies. There was on the other hand significant policy continuity between the Bhutto regime and Zia ul Huq’s government which came to power in 1977 (Bhutto 1979). Described in detail by Shah (2011 p 77-78). However Reedall (2011) a former CIA employee argues that a “jihadist” state is possible in Pakistan and the US should step up its social and political intervention in Pakistan to prevent this. The MQM which is least kinship structured has nevertheless been accommodated within the state patronage networks through its participation in ruling alliances with the PPP and the ANP. This is illustrated most graphically by the politics of the Muslim League (Qaid e Azam) which provided the core of Musharaf’s political regime during 2002-2008 but has been the PPP’s coalition partner sine 2011. Leiven (2011 p88-89) sees it as akin to international law with kinship groups assuming sovereign status. He regards jirgas and panchayats as the only democratic legal institutions in Pakistan (p 90-92). The Taliban negotiated Nizam-i-Adle jusidcal system implemented in the Swat valley in 2008 has not been formally abandoned as yet. This was recognized by the leadership of the Indian Communist party as early as the 1920s when it actively supported the Progressive Writers Movement of Urdu novelists and poets. Beginning with the publication of Sholey (Flames) in the mid 1930s writers in this tradition (Ismat Chughtai, Sadat Hasan Manto, Krisihan Chandar) produced high quality sexually explicit literature during the 1950s and 1960s (Ahmed 1925 p 43-111). References Abu Zahab M (2002) “Sectarianism as a substitute identity” in Mumtaz (et al) (ed) p 77-95 Ahmad A (1998) Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment Karachi Oxford University Press.

Ahmad F (2002) “Ethnicity, State And National Integration” in Naseem S.M and Nadvi K The Post Colonial State And Social Transformation in India and Pakistan Karail Oxford University Press p 97-130 Ahmad M (2009) “Social Profile of Higher Bureaucracy in Pakistan” Lahore Journal of Policy Studies Vol 3 No 1 p57-82 Ahmad S. (1952) Urdu Adab Aur Taraqqi Passand Tahreek” Uruj o Zawal Lahore Harf Publications. Aiken, M.D (ed) David Hume’s Moral and Political Philosphy, New York, Longman. Akhund I (2000) Trial and Error: the Advent and Eclipse of Benazir Bhutto Karachi Oxford University Press. Alavi H (1972) “The State in Post Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh” New Left Review 1:74 p5-39 Ali I and Mumtaz S (2002) “Understanding Pakistan – the impact of global regional, national and local interactions” in Mumtaz S Ali I and Racine J-L Pakistan: the Contours of State and Society Karachi Oxford University Press, P93-127. Almond G and Coleman J (1960) The Politics of the Developing Areas Princeton, Princeton University Press Almond G A and Verba S (1963) The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy In Five Nations Boston, Lester Braun and Co Ansari J.A (2006) Structure and Growth of Pakistan’s Exports 1995-2005 Karachi Applied Economics Research Centre Arbalester A (1984) The Rise And Decline of Western Liberalism Oxford Basil Blackwell. Ashraf A.S.M (2010) “US Drone Strikes in Pakistan. Increasing Trends Questionable Legitimacy and the Issues of Tacit Co-operation” Pakistan Journal of International Relations Vol 1 No2 p1-46 Aveneri S (2012) “The Strange Triumph of Liberal Democracy” Foreign Affairs Vol.91 No.1,Jan-Feb p68-74 Ayers A (2009) Speaking Like A State: Language and Nationalism in Pakistan Cambridge, Cambridge University Press Aziz H (2008) “Bairuni taqaten aur Pakistani jumhuriyat” Awam 16 May (Urdu) Aziz S (2009) Between Dreams and Realities’: Some Milestones in Pakistan’s History Karachi Oxford University Press Baig-A (2000) Barelviat kya hai (Urdu) Lahore Idara Isha’at-i-Islam Baqir F (2009) “Civil Society Engagement and Aid Effectiveness” Lahore Journal of Policy Studies Vol3 No.1, p97-116 Baudrillard J (1983) In the Shadow of Silent Majorities New York Semi text (e) Bauman Z (1992) Limitation of Post modernity London Rutledge Beeson M and Basely N (ed) Issues in 21st Centaury World Politics New York, The Free Press Bhutto Z.A If I am Assassinated Vikas New Delhi Blackburn R (2011) “Crisis Mark Two” New Left Review 11:72 p33-62 Buchanan H and Tollock G (1962) The Calculus of Consent: The Legal Foundations of Constitutional Democracy An Arbor University of Michigan Press Capron F (1996) The Web of Life London, Harper Coller Case W (2010) “Democracy and Democratization” in Beeson M and Bisley N (ed) Issues in 21st Century World Politics Caruthers T (2002) ‘The End of the Transition Paradigm’ Journal of Democracy Vol.3 No.1 p5-21 Castillo M (2000) The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture 2 Volumes, Oxford Blackwell Chandra K (2004) Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Headcounts in India Cambridge, Cambridge University Press

Cohen S (2004) The Idea of Pakistan Washington, Brookings Press Deutsch K (1961) “Social Mobilization and Political Development” America Political Science Review Vol55 No4 P634-647 Diamond L (1993) Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries Boulder Lynne Rienner Diamond O (et al) (1990) Politics in Developing Countries Experiences with Democracy Boulder Lynne Reinner. Durre-e-Nayyab (2011) Estimating the Middle Class in Pakistan Islamabad Pakistan Institute of Development Economies Working Paper 2011 77 Elkins D and Simeon R (1979) “ A Cause in Search of Effect or What Does Political Culture Explain” Comparative Politics No11 p1-31 Evans P (1975) Embedded Autonomy States and Industrial Transformation Princeton, Princeton University Press Federation of Pakistan Chamber of Commerce and Industry (2011) Survey of Pakistan Large Scale Manufacturing Sector 2011 Karachi Fukuyuma F (2012) “Can Liberal Democracy Survive the Decline of the Middle Class” Foreign Affairs Vol.91 No.Jan-Feb p. 53 – 64) Gaborieau M (2002) “Religion in the Pakistan Polity” in Ali and Mumtaz (2002, p 43-55) Gambovsky V V (1964) The Peoples of Pakistan Lahore Pakistan Publishing House Geddes B (1999) ‘What do we know about democratization after 20 years’ Annual Review of Political Science No.2 (June) p115-144 Gellner E (1967) ‘Democracy and Internalization’ Europe Journal of Sociology Vol 8 No2 P243-271 Giddens A (1990) The Consequences of Modernity Cambridge Polity Gilani S.Z (1985) “Drug Abuse: inner needs and outer reality” Proceedings of the First International Congress of the World Islamic Association for Mental Health Lahore p 67-72 Gilani S.Z (2002) “Personal and Social power in Pakistan” in Weiss A and S.Z Gilani (ed) Power and Civil Society in Pakistan Karachi Oxford University Press p49-64 Government of Pakistan (2011) Pakistan Economic Survey 2010-11 (PES), Islamabad Statistical Appendix Gray J (1980) Liberalism Milton Keynes Open University Press Greenfield L (1992) Nationalism: Five Roads to Modern Identity Cambridge, Cambridge University Press Habermas J (2001) The Post national Constellation Cambridge Polity Hall J (1988) Liberalism London Paladin Haqqani A (2002) “Samaji Behbud ki Tanzeemeen our Bairuni Imdad” Jassarat 18th Sept (Urdu) Hardgrave R (1993) “India: Dilemmas of Diversity” Journal of Democracy Vol4 No1 P 71-85 Hashmi A.S (2010) “Politics of Ethnicity In Dictatorship and Democracy” Pakistan Journal of International Relations Vol1 No2 P115-137 Hayek. F (1978) New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas, London, Routledge Held D (1993) Democracy and the Global Order Cambridge, Polity Hirst Pres Paul G. Thompson E (1999), Globalisation in Question Cambridge Polity Huntington (1965) “Political Development and Political Decay” World Politics Vol 17 No 3 p 386-430 Huntington S (1984) “Will More Countries Become Democratic” Political Quarterly Vol99 No1 P 193-218 Huntington S (1991) The Third Wave, Cambridge Harvard University Press Hussain A (2009) ‘Hamara Mauquf aur uska istidlal’ J Awam Urdu 7.11.2009

Hussain SA (2006) “Islam in the Democratic Matrix” in Tahir N (ed) Different Faces of the Islamic Umma’ in a Globalized World Karachi Goethe Institute p1-25 Inglehart R (1997) Modernization and Post Modernization Princeton, Princeton University Press Jalal A (1985) The Sole Spokesman Cambridge, Cambridge University Press Janjua M.A (et al) (2011) Sindh Economic Survey 2009-2011 Karachi, Institute of Business Management Jessop B (1997) ‘Capitalism and its Future’ Review of International Political Economy Vol 4 No3 P561-581 Kakar S (1978) The Inner World: A Psychoanalytic Study of Childhood and Society in India New Delhi Oxford University Press Keane J (2003) Global Civil Society Cambridge University Press Khan O (2002) “Critical Engagements: NGOs and the State” in Weiss A and Gilani Z Opal Kohle A (et al) (2004) The Success of India’s Democracy Cambridge, Cambridge University Press Landes D (1998) The Wealth and Poverty of Nations New York Norton Levsky S andWay L (2002) “The Rise of Comparative Authoritarian”, Journal of Democracy, Vol.13 No.1 P51-66. Lieven A. (2011) Pakistan: A Hard Country London Allen Lane Liphart A (1999) Patterns of Democracy New Haven Yale University Press Lipset S (1959) Political Man Garden city NY Doubleday Locke J (1957) ‘ A letter Concerning Toleration’Dolring D (2009) Readings in Liberalism, Fredrich Neumann Stiting, Islamabad p27-31. Lodhi M (2011) Pakistan Beyond the Crisis State Karachi Oxford University Press Pakistan Centre for Philanthropy (PCP) (2007) Analysis of MDG’s and Civil Society in Pakistan (unpublished) cites NGO figures, omit ref to John Hopkins Survey. Lopez Maya M (2008) “Venezuela Today: A Participative and Protagonist Democracy” Socialist Register 2008 Marlen London P160-180. Lyotard J-F (1984) The Post Modern Condition: A Report on Knowledge Manchester, Manchester University Press Mann M (1987) “Citizenship and ruling class strategies” Sociology Vol 21 No3 P411-440 Meade M (1964) Communities in Cultural Evolution New Haven Yale University Press Meenai S and Ansari J.A (2010) Money and Banking In Pakistan Karachi Oxford University Press Mill J.S (1993) On Liberty Harmondsworth Penguin Moore B (1969) Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy Harmondsworth Allen Lane Mumtaz S (2002) “Nationalism, Ethnicity and the Mohajir Political Movement in Sindh” in Mumtaz ed (2002) p96-136 Nasim and Nadvi, (ed) (2002) The Post Colonial State and Social Transformation in India and Pakistan Karachi OUI. Nawaz S (2008) Crossed Swords: Pakistan, the Army and the Wars Within Oxford, Oxford University Press Nawaz S (2011) “Army and Politics” in Lodhi M (ed) ed Pakistan: Beyond the Crisis State Karachi Oxford University Press Niaz I (2010) The Culture of Power and Governance in Pakistan Karachi Oxford University Press Noman O (2002) “An Uncivil Society, the rote of shadow privatization, conflict and ideology in the government of Pakistan” in Wiess and Gilan (Oput) p167-185 Nozick R (1974) State, Anarchy and Utopia New York Harvard University Press

Olson M (1965) The Logic of Collective Action Cambridge Harvard University Press O Donell G and Schmitler. PC (1986) Transition from Authoritarian Rule Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, Baltimore John Hopkins University Press Pasha A. G, Jamal H and Iqbal MA (2007) Dimensions of the Nonprofit Sector in Pakistan, Karachi SPDC Pasha M.K (2002) “Savage capitalism and civil society in Pakistan” in Weiss S and Gilani (2002) (ed) Power and Civil Society in Pakistan Karachi Oxford University Press p 18-47 Phillipson N (1983) “Adam Smith as Civic Moralist” in Gnateiff M and I Hunt Wealth and Virtue Cambridge, Cambridge University Press Popper K (1992) In Search of a Better World London Macmillan Putman R (1993) Making Democracy Work Civic Traditions In Modern Italy Princeton, Princeton University Press Qadeer M A (1999) ‘The Silence of the Burqa’ The Montreal Gazette Sept 21 Qadeer M A (2006) Pakistan Social and Cultural Transformation in a Muslim Nation London Routledge Qadeer M.A (2009) “The cultural segmentation of Pakistani women” Lahore Journal of Policy Studies Vol 1 No 1 p 83-96 Qadier MA (2006) Pakistan: Social and Cultural Transformation in a Muslim Society New York Routledge Rabuskha A and Shepsle K (1972) Politics In Plural Societies Colombia Merrill Ravillion M (2010) “The Developing World’s Bulging (but Vulnerable) Middle class” World Development Vol38 No4 445-454 Rawls J (1971) A Theory of Justice Oxford Basil Blackwell Rawls J (1993) Political Liberalism Oxford, Oxford University Press Reidell B (2011) Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America and Global Jihad New York Brookings Reilly B (2001) Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Rehman T (2002) “The Language of the Salariat” in Nasim and Nadvi (ed) Opal (2002 p97-129) Rueschemeyer D Huber E and Stephen J D (1997) Capitalist Development and Democracy Chicago University of Chicago Press Salman A and Arbi .K.A (2009) Economic Freedom In Pakistan Sub National Index Islamabad Economic Freedom Network and Development Pool Sayeed A (2002) “State, Society, Conjunctures and Disjuncture’s. Pakistan Manufacturing Performance” in Nasreen and Nadvi Opal 2002 p 203-244. Schedler A. (2006) Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition, Boulder Lynne Rienner Schedler A. (2002) ‘Elections Without Democracy’ Journal of Democracy Vol.13 No.2 p36-50 Sen A (2009) The Idea of Justice Harmonds worth Penguin Shafqats (2011) “Praetorians and the People” in Lodhi (ed) Opal p95-112 Shah A (2011_ “Getting the Military Out of Pakistani Politics” Foreign Affairs Vol90 No3 p69-8 Shaheed F(2002) “Women’s Experiences of Identity, Religion and Activism in Pakistan” Naseem and Nadvi Op at p343-389 Siddiqa A (2007) Military Inc: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy Karachi Oxford University Press Siddiqui A (2012) “KESC me union ko kasey shikasat de” (Urdu) Nayan Dour (Karachi) 3rd March Siddiqui Z and Ansari J (2006) “Governing the Labour Market” Pakistan Institute of Development Economics Paper presented at the 22nd Annual Conference Islamabad

Sinha and R.C Tripathi (1994) ‘Individualism in a collective culture’ in Ken Uetal (eds) Individualism and Collectivism Theory, Method and Applications London Sage p119-151 Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions Cambridge, Cambridge University Press Smith A (1976) An Enquiry Into the Nature and causes of the Wealth of Nations (two volumes in one) ed Edwin Cannon Chicago University Press Chicago Sobhan .R (2002) “State and Governance As Factors in Development” in Naseem and Nadvi (Ibed) p3-19 Social Policy and Development Centre (SPDC) (2001) Social Development in Pakistan Annual Review Karachi Oxford University Press Stbeck W (2011) “Markets vs Voters” New Left Review 11:71 p3-30 Sumar S (2002) “Women’s Movement in Pakistan: Problem and Prospects” Naseem and Nadvi Op at p413-444 Sarup M (1993) An Introductory Guide to Postmodernism and Post Structuralism Brighton Harvester Wheatsheaf Taylor G (2010) The New Political Sociology London Palgrave Macmillan Urry J ( 2006) ‘Complexity’ Theory, Culture and Society Vol 23 No 2 and 3 P 111-117 Urry J (2005) ‘The Complexity of the global’ Theory, Culture and Society Vol 22 No 5 P 235-54 Weiner M (1987) ‘Empirical Democratic Theory’ Weiner M (ed) Competitive Elections in Developing Countries, Durham Duke University Press P3-36 Weiss A and Gilani Z (ed) (2002) Power and Civil Society in Pakistan Karachi Oxford University Press. Weis M (2002 A) Wall Within Walls Karachi Oxford Weiss M (2006) Protest and Possibilities and Coalitions for Political Change in Malaysia Stanford Stanford University Press Welch S (1993) The Concept of Political Culture New York Macmillan Wizarat S (2003) The Rise and Fall of Industrial Productivity in Pakistan Karachi Oxford University Press World Bank (2011) World Development Indicators 2011 Washington Young I (1989) “Polity and group difference: a critique of the idea of universal citizenship” Ethics vol 99 No1 p250-74 Zaheer S (1950) Yeh kis ka Pakistan hai Lahore Awami Awaz Zaidi S.A (2009) Issues in the Pakistan Economy Karachi Oxford University Press